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ALIENATION AND RECONCILIATION IN  
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
BY 
ANN M. EISENBERG* 
After rancher Ammon Bundy’s forceful occupation of the Malheur 
National Wildlife Refuge to protest federal “tyranny” in 2016, 
mainstream commentary dismissed Bundy and his supporters as 
crackpots. But the dismissal of the occupation as errant overlooked 
this event’s significance. This conflict: 1) involved a clash over scarce 
natural resources, of the type that will likely gain more frequency and 
intensity in the face of climate change; and 2) highlighted the popular 
idea that the federal government and federal environmental regulations 
are the enemy of the (white, rural, male) worker. This thread of anti-
environmental, anti-federal alienation among many working people has 
been given light consideration in climate scholarship and policy. Yet, 
this alienation goes beyond Bundy. Altogether, these are social issues 
within social-ecological systems (SESs) of various scales, which the 
law must evolve to address. 
Using the Malheur occupation as a focal point, I suggest that 
adaptive governance, also known as adaptive comanagement, is not 
only appropriate for operationalizing resilience theory in SES 
regulation, but is also likely a pathway to steer climate governance 
more toward reconciliation over alienation, reducing the risks conflicts 
pose to effective outcomes. Scholars have recognized that a shift from 
environmental advocacy’s traditional focus on adversarial approaches 
is necessary in the face of climate change, but few have focused 
specifically on how to achieve this shift. Two anti-federal, anti-
environmental social movements—the Land Transfer Movement and 
the War on Coal Campaign—illustrate the impediment this particular 
form of alienation within SESs has posed to effective climate 
governance, while also highlighting the longstanding and inhibiting rift 
between labor and environmental interests. 
	
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The following people have 
my gratitude for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article: Loka Ashwood, 
Robin Kundis Craig, Laura Griffin, Patrick McGinley, Lisa Pruitt, Jesse Richardson, J.B. Ruhl, 
Steven Selin, participants in the Sixth Annual Southern Clinical Conference Work-in-Progress 
Workshop at Charlotte School of Law, especially my discussant, Jason Huber, and classmates in 
Dr. Selin’s spring 2016 course at West Virginia University, Human Dimensions of Natural 
Resource Management. All errors are my own. 
7_TOJCI.EISENBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2017  1:26 PM 
128 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 47:127 
I examine one case study, the Malheur Comprehensive 
Conservation Plan planning process, as an illustration of adaptive 
governance successfully reconciling ranchers, environmentalists, 
tribes, and several agencies—mitigating anti-federal and anti-
environmental alienation and the work–environment rift, to the benefit 
of federal SES climate adaptation mechanisms (and showing that 
Malheur was an ironic choice for Bundy’s protest). By contrast, a 
second case study, the administrative rulemaking process that created 
the federal Clean Power Plan, illustrates how process can fuel 
alienation and undermine the substance of federal climate policy. 
Adaptive governance receives more consideration for public lands and 
adaptation issues than for climate mitigation, but there is potential in 
the climate mitigation context for the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency to apply some of the adaptive governance and 
reconciliation principles illustrated at Malheur. 
The research for this Article began prior to the 2016 presidential 
election and will be published in the weeks following the 2017 
inauguration. Although the relevance of much of environmental law 
scholarship may have been called into question in the new political 
landscape, this discussion now seems more important than ever in light 
of the country’s ongoing political and cultural divides that continue to 
stymie efforts to address climate change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Ammon Bundy forcefully occupied the Malheur National Wildlife 
Refuge in Harney County, Oregon, in early 2016, he purported to protest 
federal “tyranny” and defend the trampled rights of ranchers.1 The public 
commentary surrounding the occupation was dismissive; many 
characterized the occupiers as interlopers or crackpots.2 However, the 
dismissal of the occupation as an errant act overlooked its significance. 
First, the event highlighted a potent thread of anti-federal, anti-
environmental sentiment among some white, working-class residents of 
rural areas. Indeed, both the occupation and the dismissive public discourse 
illustrated critical aspects of a deep, urban–rural cultural divide: the urban-
rooted notion of wildlife as a place of purity to be set aside, the rural-rooted 
notion of land as a source of economic activity, and a sense of anti-urbanism 
that has been powerfully germinating in rural areas.3 While Ammon Bundy 
and his father, Cliven—who had his own standoff with federal agents over 
grazing rights—are considered terrorists or extremists by many, they are 
folk heroes to many others.4 The Bundys thus represent the idea that federal 
	
 1  Hal Bernton, The Story Behind the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, Ranchers and 
Armed Anti-Government Protestors, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/W3QZ-
KEG6; Faces of the Malheur Occupation: Meet the Militants and Their Visitors, OREGONIAN (Jan. 
22, 2016) [hereinafter Faces of the Malheur Occupation], https://perma.cc/QL46-2VD2; Liam 
Stack, Wildlife Refuge Occupied in Protest of Oregon Ranchers’ Prison Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
3, 2016, at A13. 
 2  E.g., Bill Chappell, Oregon Occupier Countersues for $666 Billion, Citing ‘Works Of The 
Devil,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO: TWO-WAY (Feb. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/YDX9-CPHJ; Timothy Egan, 
Opinion, Crackpots in Cowboy Hats, and in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/AK34-JZ6E; Hal Herring, Can We Make Sense of the Malheur Mess?, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/CT7D-QT9F; Janell Ross, Why Aren’t We 
Calling the Oregon Occupiers ‘Terrorists’?, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 3, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/323R-DBTQ; Alan Pyke, The Crackpot Alternative Legal System that Threatens 
to Escalate the Oregon Standoff, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/7KWE-LCCD; 
see also Sam Levin, Oregon Militia Standoff: The 23 Men and Two Women Facing Felony 
Charges, GUARDIAN (London) (Feb. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/JYL8-PTWK (pointing out that, of 
the twenty-five occupants, only three were residents of Oregon). 
 3  Lisa R. Pruitt & Linda T. Sobczynski, Protecting People, Protecting Places: What 
Environmental Litigation Conceals and Reveals about Rurality, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 326, 330–31 
(2016). 
 4  See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, “Bundy Militia” Pocket Constitution 
Tops Amazon Charts Amidst Trump-Khan Feud: NCCS Constitution Cloaked in Recruitment 
Materials for Sagebrush Rebel Movement Steeped in Racism, Anti-Federal Domestic Terrorism 
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/L9QJ-Q3UA (discussing popularity of particular version of 
pocket constitution brandished by Malheur occupiers). The Bundy Ranch has almost than 
200,000 followers on Facebook. Bundy Ranch, FACEBOOK, https://perma.cc/WWS8-D8J7 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2017). National elected officials have also expressed support for the family. Jack 
Jenkins, As The Bundy Brothers Occupy A Federal Building, Here Are The GOP Candidates 
Who Supported Their Dad, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/UY3R-GS3Q (listing 
then Presidential-candidate Donald J. Trump, Senators Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Ted Cruz (R-
Tex.), and others); see also Joel Dyer, Opinion, The New Era of Conspiracy Thinking: Why 
People Die When We Talk About Gun Control, BOULDER WKLY. (Feb. 7, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/CE3Z-YNPK (discussing how the antigovernment movement involves 
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natural resources law is an illegitimate encroachment on the rights and way 
of life of rural, blue-collar (mostly white, male) workers.5 
Second, the occupation needs to be contextualized as a violent conflict 
over scarce natural resources resulting in a human casualty, in addition to 
economic, ecological, and cultural losses.6 We should therefore consider it 
through the lens of climate change. Namely, a group of angry ranchers 
occupying a wildlife refuge and demanding use of its resources is precisely 
what a conflict over natural resources will look like in the era of climate 
change. Although there is a long history of western “wrangling” over natural 
resources and public lands ownership,7 most notably manifested in the so-
	
frustration over issues such as unemployment and farm failures that “funnels” into violent 
radicalism and a perceived war with the government). 
 5  See Carol M. Rose, Response, Claiming While Complaining on the Federal Public Lands: 
A Problem for Public Property or a Special Case?, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 95, 95–96 (2015) (“In the 
spring of 2014, rancher Cliven Bundy, together with a group of self-appointed armed 
‘militiamen,’ placed himself in a standoff with the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 
southern Nevada. The BLM insisted that Bundy owed over $1 million in delinquent and current 
fees for grazing his livestock on federally owned land, but Bundy insisted that grazing on this 
land should be costless to him and refused to pay. Bundy’s group effectively chased off the 
federal officials and, in doing so, garnered considerable conservative media support—at least 
until Bundy himself made some extemporaneous and intemperate remarks about the state’s 
African-American population. Not surprisingly, his reference to alleged welfare freeloading 
invited comparison to his own considerable outstanding bill for the use of federal property.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also id. at 111 (“Sagebrush westerners sniff something like the odor of 
a royal domain in the special status of the federal public lands, a domain controlled by 
dictatorial bureaucrats who hold their region in a subordinate status.”). See generally Jaime 
Fuller, The Long Fight Between the Bundys and the Federal Government, From 1989 to Today, 
WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/P49D-WVX9 (giving a timeline of the 
Bundys’ relationship with the federal government); Tay Wiles, New Data Released on Violent 
Threats to Federal Employees, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (June 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/CBL2-
24Y4 (discussing connections between the Bundys’ antigovernment conduct and longstanding 
regional history of violence toward federal public lands officers). In prosecution pending as of 
this writing, Cliven is charged with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, 
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and assault on a federal law enforcement officer, id. § 111(a)(1)(b), along 
with many other charges. See Superseding Criminal Indictment at 37–53, United States v. 
Bundy, No. 2:16-cr-00046-GMN-PAL (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2016), ECF No. 27. 
 6  Economic losses were estimated at $6 million. Diantha Parker, A Mess Left by Occupiers 
at the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in Oregon, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/F6YQ-
6SAC. 
 7  Hillary Hoffmann, Demand Management, Climate Change, and the Livestock Grazing 
Crisis in the Great Basin, GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L., Winter 2016, at 14, 15; Donald J. 
Kochan, Public Lands and the Federal Government’s Compact-Based “Duty to Dispose”: A Case 
Study of Utah’s H.B. 148–The Transfer of Public Lands Act, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1133, 1336 (2013); 
see also Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective on 
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848 (1982) (“Land use fights are an old tradition in 
the West, and it is tempting to regard the Sagebrush Rebellion as nothing more than another 
episode in a long history of conflict. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the Rebellion as a 
regional curiosity. Behind the simple proposal of the sagebrush rebels lie complex 
intergovernmental issues relating to ownership and management of the West’s natural 
resources. While the rebels’ motives are suspect, the movement has been fueled by genuine 
uneasiness and increasing conflict between the states and the federal government over 
management of the public domain. . . . As the open spaces disappear, competition for energy 
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called Sagebrush Rebellion,8 one should anticipate that these tensions will 
worsen with the increased stresses of climate change. 
This thread of anti-federal, anti-environmental sentiment among white, 
rural, working people and its relevance to managing scarce natural 
resources has been given light consideration in climate law and policy 
scholarship.9 However, it has been a meaningful obstacle to a more unified 
and effective national approach to climate change. It is a social element in 
the national social-ecological system (SES)—a thorny, people-centric issue 
closely linked to land use. It is also an issue that land use regulations have 
traditionally treated as outside their purview, but which the law must evolve 
to account for as a “factor[] in the law-and-society system that threaten[s] 
dynamical system sustainability,” as well as the rule of law.10 
Using the Malheur occupation as a focal point, this Article examines 
two anti-federal, anti-environmental social movements, to the extent those 
movements have involved populist sentiments expressed by working 
residents of mostly rural areas: 1) the movement to transfer public lands in 
the west to the states (the “Land Transfer Movement”) and 2) the movement 
to counteract regulation of the coal industry (“the War on Coal Campaign”). 
While these movements tend to be treated as distinct, their commonalities 
illustrate how the alienation of interest here is a phenomenon of national 
scale. This analysis sets aside for now the heavy involvement of political and 
industry actors in these movements, with the reasoning that addressing a 
broken political system is a different conversation than one focused on rural 
alienation, labor, and land use. The specific objectives of this inquiry are 
threefold: 1) to better understand this segment of society that 
environmentalism appears to have left behind and the related alienation 
manifested in these movements; 2) to better understand how these 
movements and related themes may impede formulation and 
implementation of effective federal climate policy; and 3) to consider how 
federal climate law and policy and effective SES management can address 
	
resources intensifies, and water resources dry up, the problems caused by our focused land 
management structure will become more acute.”). 
 8  See generally GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 72–
73 (7th ed. 2014). 
 9  Carol Rose has touched upon this issue in a discussion of Cliven Bundy’s 2014 standoff. 
Rose, supra note 5, at 111. Michelle Bryan also argues that avenues for local input in federal 
lands management would mitigate local outrage and calls for a federal land transfer. Michelle 
Bryan, Learning Both Directions: How Better Federal-Local Land Use Collaboration Can Quiet 
the Call for Federal Lands Transfers, 76 MONT. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015). 
 10  J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: 
A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 
860 (1996); see also Hoffmann, supra note 7, at 15, 27 (“[F]or decades, [] the rule of law had 
absolutely no impact on [Cliven] Bundy’s actions . . . . Bundy prevailed over the federal 
government and the rule of law. And he is not alone.”); cf. Carl T. Bogus, Heller and 
Insurrectionism, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 253, 265 (2008) (criticizing the Supreme Court of the 
United States for ignoring insurrectionism); Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution 
Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 78–95 (1986) (arguing that ethical and economic approaches 
to combatting pollution must be reconciled in order to achieve environmental goals). 
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this and comparable forms of alienation, and even funnel it into productive 
pathways. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the current literature on 
climate governance and the evolving understanding of how law can 
accommodate SESs. After establishing some definitions in Part III.A, Part 
III.B turns to a substantial social tension that has always overshadowed 
environmental regulation: the longstanding rift between labor- or work-
related advocacy and environmental advocacy, and the common perception 
that environmental regulation is the enemy of (certain) workers’ well-being. 
Part III.C discusses the two social movements noted above, using the Great 
Basin and central Appalachia as regions to illustrate some of the movements’ 
characteristics. This Part notes three important parallels between the 
movements, in addition to the work–environment rift: 1) the historical 
absenteeism of the federal government in the regions where these 
movements see support; 2) the rural cultural and economic underpinnings of 
both movements; and 3) the lack of autonomous land use decision making in 
both regions. The discussion addresses these issues’ significance to climate 
governance and SESs. Part III.D then considers the curative potential of 
collaborative decision making for the work–environment rift. 
Parts IV and V argue that adaptive governance, also known as adaptive 
comanagement, and its embrace of procedures to secure stakeholder buy-in 
are on the right path toward remedying these issues. Part IV presents a case 
study as a success story and Part V presents a case study as a cautionary 
tale, while observing the relevance of certain land use planning principles to 
both scenarios. Part IV revisits the Malheur refuge and examines the 
comprehensive conservation planning process executed at Malheur pursuant 
to the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997,11 
concluding that Malheur as an SES in fact has lessons to offer as a case 
study in adaptive governance and reflexive law. This success is perhaps 
unsurprising, since the Malheur scenario matches well with Robin Kundis 
Craig and J.B. Ruhl’s summation of conditions conducive to successful 
adaptive management.12 However, the process also appeared to mitigate anti-
environmental, anti-federal sentiment in one comprehensive initiative, while 
also mending a localized work–environment rift. Malheur stands out in its 
illustration of the unique sociocultural benefits of successful execution of 
adaptive governance. 
Part V then contrasts the Malheur study with the plight of the hotly 
contested Clean Power Plan (CPP) promulgated by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and considers whether the more 
elusive aims of federal climate mitigation could be informed by the 
principles illustrated at Malheur. This Part suggests that the process used to 
	
 11  Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee 
(2012)). The 1997 Improvement Act amended the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2012), which provided guidelines and 
directives for the administration and management of the national refuge system. 
 12  Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014). 
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create the CPP did little to address the populist, cultural issues catalyzing 
movements like the War on Coal Campaign, but more likely exacerbated 
them. To better address the social issues discussed throughout this Article, 
administrative rulemaking would need to be reconsidered or restructured as 
the main avenue for pursuing climate mitigation. Although considered more 
rarely than in the public-lands adaptation context, there is potential in the 
climate mitigation context for EPA to apply some of the adaptive 
governance and reconciliation principles illustrated at Malheur. 
This Article contributes to the body of scholarship seeking to 
synthesize climate theory—including Resilience, New Governance, Dynamic 
Federalism, Transgovernmental Networks, Adaptive Management, and 
Adaptive Governance frameworks—while also identifying and assessing 
specific law and policy mechanisms that can best achieve those theoretical 
aims. Scholars have also recognized that a shift from environmental 
advocacy’s traditional focus on adversarial approaches is necessary in the 
face of climate change, but few have focused specifically on how to achieve 
this shift.13 The Article has two goals in addition to adding to this dialogue: 1) 
to bring pressing social issues closer to the center of a discussion that has 
tended to skew more towards the ecological;14 and 2) to embrace and 
contribute to a philosophical evolution that appears increasingly embedded 
in climate commentators’ outlooks. This shift reflects an attitude of 
searching for opportunity in crisis;15 seeking to reconcile opposites and 
dissolve artificial conceptual divides;16 and acknowledging that 
	
 13  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 432–33 (2010) [hereinafter Ruhl, Climate Change 
Adaptation] (“Climate change adaptation thus presents an opportunity for environmental law to 
break free from its culture of litigation and contestation and build back what that culture has 
eroded most—trust. Trust generally does not come about through threats to sue. . . . But 
environmental law has a choice to make and the luxury of making it early in the formulation of 
climate change adaptation policy—is it going to be about conflict or conciliation?”); id. at 431–
32 (discussing “threats to sue” as the environmental movement’s approach to disputes and also 
stating: “Environmental law is not omnipotent, though one would not gather so from the 
rhetoric of environmental law on climate change mitigation policy.”). 
 14  Compare Vicky J. Meretsky et al., Migration and Conservation: Frameworks, Gaps, and 
Synergies in Science, Law, and Management, 41 ENVTL. L. 447, 454 (2011) (noting examples of 
how human actions increase species mortality), with Geoff Ward, Microclimates of Racial 
Meaning: Historical Racial Violence and Environmental Impacts, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 575, 603–05 
(2016) (discussing how environmental racism results from racial violence), and Robert R.M. 
Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
23, 23–24, 64–66 (2012) (discussing how harms from natural disasters fall heaviest on those with 
the least power). 
 15  E.g., Neal Donahue et al., How to Transform Climate Change from Crisis to Opportunity, 
DEVEX, (Nov. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/UGB9-9M77 (discussing ways in which agricultural 
practices have addressed crises). 
 16  Cf. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548 
(2000) (arguing that in administrative law, “[t]here is no purely private realm and no purely 
public one[—only a] set of negotiated relationships between public and private actors”); Alison 
Peck, Sustainable Development and the Reconciliation of Opposites, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 151, 
182–83 (2012) (arguing that embracing anti-rationalist traditions such as Taoism could help re-
conceptualize seemingly irreconcilable tensions inherent in sustainable development theory); 
Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Land Use - Environmental Law Distinction: A Geo-Feminist Critique, 
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considerations of the ends of climate policy (i.e., mitigation and adaptation) 
cannot somehow be treated separately from the means of climate 
governance (i.e., process).17 Drawing on these themes, this analysis of an 
under-discussed demographic and of the Malheur and CPP case studies 
provides a unique angle in the picture of effective, climate-era SES 
management. 
II. CLIMATE THEORY VERSUS CLIMATE LAW AND POLICY 
Climate theory and practice have both evolved over the past several 
decades, although the former more swiftly than the latter.18 Scholars and 
practitioners tend to conceptualize approaches to climate change under two 
discrete categories: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation involves initiatives 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the hopes of reducing the effects of 
climate change.19 Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for vehicles, 
for instance, are recognized as serving mitigation aims.20 Adaptation involves 
responses to either anticipated or actual changes in the environment with 
the aim of reducing harms borne from those changes.21 For instance, many 
coastal communities are already adjusting their infrastructure in response to 
	
13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 55 (2002) (criticizing the land use–environmental law distinction as 
“an outgrowth of the male-female dualism that plagues western thought”); Christopher M. 
Kimrey, Learning to See the Opportunities in Crisis and Catastrophe: A Decisions Maker’s Guide 
to the Issue-Attention Cycle 85–86 (Sept. 2015) (unpublished MA thesis, Naval Graduate School, 
Monterey, California), https://perma.cc/33DM-WDGZ (advocating “building a comprehensive 
landscape of . . . dissimilar crises” to determine the appropriate resilience for dealing with 
crisis, rather than simply relying on a legislation’s reactive decision making or a department’s 
prospective decision making). To resolve artificial divides, this Article takes a tone that may 
strike some as unusual. It gives the benefit of the doubt, or at least declines to condemn actors 
who we might normally be inclined to characterize as the root of the problem. The actions of 
Ammon and Cliven Bundy are, of course, condemnable. However, this Article’s aim is not to 
examine human culpability. It assumes instead, in what may or may not be an artificial mental 
exercise, that failures in the law alone are responsible for conflicts and alienation. Cf. Robert 
Pondiscio, Opinion, The Miseducation of Donald Trump Voters, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/YFK3-W754 (“[W]e largely overlooked a crisis that’s been hiding in plain sight 
for years . . . . Trump supporters ‘were produced in the first instance by the failure of the larger 
society to give them the skills they need to compete in the greatly changed global economy.’ 
That’s one’s on us.” (quoting Marc Tucker, Donald Trump, Education Policy and the Future of 
American Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/852X-5KLB)). 
 17  Sagoff, supra note 10, at 24, 95 (urging joint consideration of the intended goals and 
means available when formulating, interpreting, and enforcing environmental law, so that ideals 
do not interfere with the potential to better protect the environment). 
 18  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 37 (“[W]hile ecologists rejected an equilibrium paradigm 
for ecosystems decades ago, environmental law has not caught up.”). 
 19  Climate Change Mitigation, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, https://perma.cc/8HMC-7GZU (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2017).  
 20  Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
https://perma.cc/E6LM-XLW3 (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 21  Adapting to Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/L7TT-
XJ37 (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
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rising sea levels.22 Some scholars have rejected a fully binary distinction 
between the two approaches.23 This is in part because global society has 
passed the point of no return for mitigating all of the effects of climate 
change.24 It might have been assumed in previous eras that enough 
mitigation would preclude the need for adaptation. Now, however, some 
combination of mitigation and adaptation is necessary.25 
Over the past several decades, sustainability theory has gained traction 
as the philosophy on how to achieve these climate governance goals.26 More 
recently, resilience theory has emerged as a counter-framework.27 
Sustainability’s main weakness, many assert, is that it presupposes 
stationarity in systems that are actually fluctuating and uncertain.28 
Sustainability has also been criticized for sanctioning current practices of 
resource consumption.29 Resilience theory, on the other hand, recognizes 
that SESs are complex, i.e., innately interdependent.30 The concept of an SES 
simply signifies the phenomenon that the ecological and the human spheres 
do not exist in isolation.31 Resilience denotes “the capacity of a [complex] 
system to experience shocks while retaining essentially the same function, 
structure, feedbacks, and therefore identity.”32 The complexity paradigm is 
now accepted throughout environmental and natural resources law 
scholarship.33 A consensus with similar themes appears to have emerged in 
	
 22  A. Dan. Tarlock & Deborah M. Chizewer, Living with Water in a Climate-Changed World: 
Will Federal Policy Sink or Swim?, 46 ENVTL. L. 491, 523–25 (2016) (discussing the efforts of 
New York City and Miami-Dade County to address rising sea levels). 
 23  E.g., James E. Parker-Flynn, The Intersection of Mitigation and Adaptation in Climate 
Law and Policy, 38 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 26 (2014) (seeing mitigation and adaptation 
as “so closely connected” and “often interdependent,” that the author urges “view[ing] 
mitigation and adaptation through a singular lens to find the interactions between the two”). 
 24  Id. at 3; Eric Holthaus, The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares are Already 
Here, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/878Z-NBT4. 
 25  See Parker-Flynn, supra note 23, at 46. 
 26  E.g., John C. Dernbach, National Governance: Still Stumbling Toward Sustainability, 39 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,321, 10,325–26 (Apr. 2009); John C. Dernbach & Federico 
Cheever, Sustainable Development and Its Discontents, 4 TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 247, 286–87 
(2015). 
 27  Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 26, at 279–86; Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm 
Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON L. REV. 841, 853–54 (2013). 
 28  Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead” — Long Live Transformation: Five Principles 
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 15–16 (2010). 
 29  Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON L. REV. 
841, 853–54 (2013). 
 30  Tracy-Lynn Humby, Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature, 4 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 
85, 91 (2014). 
 31  Id. 
 32  J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal 
Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ruhl, General Design Principles] (quoting Brian Walker et al., A Handful of 
Heuristics and Some Propositions for Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, 
11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2006, art. 13, at 2). 
 33  Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Think About Complex Environmental Systems in 
Environmental and Natural Resource Law and Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 
24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 100–01 (2013) [hereinafter Craig, Learning to Think] (arguing that 
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energy scholarship, calling for an integrative approach to climate policy that 
reconciles the physical and the societal with joint considerations of energy 
security, energy independence, and a “green economy.”34 
But what is the mechanism for “operationalizing resilience”?35 Several 
frameworks have gained traction in recent years. New governance, dynamic 
federalism, transgovernmental networks, and adaptive management are 
among the most discussed. New governance theory denotes a turn 
‘away from the familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by 
administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, 
multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving’ governance. The central organizing 
principles of new governance theory are stakeholder participation, 
collaboration among interests, diversity of and competition between 
instruments, decentralization of governance structures, integration of policy 
domains, flexibility, and an emphasis on noncoerciveness and adaptation.36 
Dynamic federalism and transgovernmental networks theory similarly 
emphasize a blurring of traditional jurisdictional and organizational lines.37 
Nonhierarchical interactions and overlapping authority among local, state, 
and federal governments, they reason, promote information exchange and 
harmonization of best practices.38 As relationships evolve over time, “the 
overlapping structure of authorities becomes less a mangle and more an 
organism.”39 
Adaptive management offers a more concrete and readily useable 
approach to natural resource management. The popular concept evolved 
from ecologists’ views of how to manage complex nonlinear systems.40 Its 
hallmark characteristic is “learning while doing”—embracing iterative 
decision-making processes in place of rigid front-end decision making.41 
“Adaptive management theory treats almost all governmental interactions as 
experiments, from which we can continuously learn what works and what 
	
we are “probably” to the point “where the complexity of ecosystems and socio-ecological 
systems is accepted as a given by environmental and natural resources law scholars”). 
 34  E.g., Victor B. Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without the Other: The Challenge of 
Integrating U.S. Environment, Energy, Climate, and Economic Policy, 44 ENVTL. L. 1079, 1086–
88 (2014). 
 35  Hannah E. Birge et al., Social-Ecological Resilience and Law in the Platte River Basin, 51 
IDAHO L. REV. 229, 250, 252–54 (2014) (“[P]olicy must become ‘cross-scale, interdisciplinary, and 
dynamic.’”) (quoting J.B. Ruhl, Panarchy and the Law, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 3, 2012, art. 31, 
at 1). 
 36  Ruhl, General Design Principles, supra note 32, at 1397 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Response “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 (2004)). 
 37  Id. at 1398–99. 
 38  Id. at 1399. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Barbara Cosens et al., The Adaptive Water Governance Project: Assessing Law, 
Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-Ecological Water Systems Facing a Changing 
Climate, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014); Emily Gardner, Note, Adaptive Management in the Face 
of Climate Change and Endangered Species Protection, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 232 (2013). 
 41  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 10–11. 
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does not.”42 Like the other theories, adaptive management seems logical 
enough, but because it calls for a fundamental overhaul of some basic tenets 
of U.S. law—namely, finality, certainty, and front-end decision making—the 
fact of actually making it happen has been a more complicated story.43 
Thus, despite the increasing detail in discussions of these frameworks, 
complexity theory and related literature still offer little in hard law to apply.44 
Adaptive management “enjoys widespread support [but] successful 
implementation in the context of real world natural resource management 
has been and remains largely elusive.”45 For instance, Craig and Ruhl note 
that some agencies have embraced the term without specifying what it is or 
creating an enabling framework, resulting in what they and others call 
adaptive management “lite.”46 Interdisciplinary scholarship in a variety of 
fields seeks to clarify specific recommendations for reforming law to fit with 
SESs.47 
Craig and Ruhl’s 2014 article, Designing Administrative Law for 
Adaptive Management, proposed “the first detailed blueprint for a new legal 
structure to match adaptive management’s decision-making structure.”48 
Their article details the three main obstacles administrative law poses to 
implementation of true adaptive management (as opposed to adaptive 
management lite): public participation requirements, finality requirements, 
and judicial review.49 They also note that adaptive management is not 
suitable for all agency decision-making contexts. Rather, “[t]he sweet spot 
for using adaptive management is when a management-problem context 
presents a dynamic system for which uncertainty and controllability are high 
and risk is low.”50 
Relevant to the discussion of case studies here, Craig and Ruhl 
emphasize the importance of stakeholder engagement, which “allows the 
agency to learn from the affected community when shaping goals and 
protocols and to communicate agency decision-making assumptions and 
rationales. To be sure, stakeholder engagement does not necessarily equate 
with stakeholder support, but lack of engagement is likely to reduce the 
chances of such support forming.”51 Although robust public participation 
within an adaptive management scheme’s highly discretionary, iterative 
	
 42  Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, “Improving” Project XL: Helping Adaptive 
Management to Work within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 155, 157 (1998–1999). 
 43  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 38–40. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Gardner, supra note 40, at 237. 
 46  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 10–11. 
 47  E.g., Ahjond S. Garmestani & Melinda Harm Benson, A Framework for Resilience-Based 
Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2013, art. 9, at 8; Marleen 
Schouten et al., Resilience-Based Governance in Rural Landscapes: Experiments with Agri-
Environment Schemes Using a Spatially Explicit Agent-Based Model, 30 LAND USE POL’Y 934, 
941 (2013). 
 48  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 61. 
 49  Id. at 28. 
 50  Id. at 19. 
 51  Id. at 24–25. 
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decision-making process would likely be undesirable, Craig and Ruhl 
emphasize the importance of public participation in “the setup phase of 
adaptive management” and the periodic “big decisions” agencies must 
make—indicating the need for “recurring, rather than continual, public 
participation.”52 They also argue that pure adaptive management would 
involve stakeholders in plan formulation earlier in the process than standard 
administrative procedure would allow.53 
“Adaptive governance” purports to build upon adaptive management. 
According to Barbara Cosens and colleagues, “[s]oon after adaptive 
management was applied, failures of this management approach gave rise to 
a new literature in which shortcomings in adaptive management were 
attributed in part to governance issues. The solution was dubbed adaptive 
governance.”54 Adaptive governance is considered a form of adaptive 
comanagement, or a marriage of new governance theory and adaptive 
management. It maintains the blurring-of-lines principles mentioned above, 
but focuses more centrally on 
improved social understanding of the dynamics of ecological systems. In other 
words, adaptive governance seeks to capitalize on both the reflexive, iterative, 
scientifically-based learning characteristic of adaptive management, as well as 
theories of new governance that extend the function of governing to a broader 
range of actors acting on a wider spatial and temporal scale.55 
Tracy-Lynn Humby has described adaptive governance “as a process that 
responds to feedback received from a managing agency undertaking 
adaptive management, through collaboration and cooperation across 
different levels of government, nongovernmental and individual action.”56 
Humby has addressed the question of whether adaptive governance and 
adaptive management “mean the same thing,” and concludes that they do 
not.57 Rather, she argues that adaptive governance facilitates adaptive 
comanagement by 
allowing the emergence and nurturing of social networks that could employ 
both social capital (trust, leadership, social networks, reciprocity, common 
rules, norms and sanctions) and social memory (experience for dealing with 
change, different role-players in social networks playing different social roles) 
in order to deal with common problems characterized by uncertainty and 
change.58 
	
 52  Id. at 31, 43. 
 53  Id. at 42–43. 
 54  Cosens et al., supra note 40, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
 55  Humby, supra note 30, at 98. 
 56  Id. (citing Barbara A. Cosens & Mark Kevin Williams, Resilience and Water Governance: 
Adaptive Governance in the Columbia River Basin, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 4, 2012, art. 3, at 2). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
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Thus, adaptive governance is not a replacement for adaptive management, 
but is rather a complementary set of hierarchies and networks that are less 
formal than traditional structures and “help facilitate information flows, 
identify knowledge gaps, and create nodes of adaptive expertise that can be 
drawn upon in times of crisis.”59 
Like adaptive management, adaptive governance succeeds in the right 
set of circumstances. Humby and others note the importance of leadership 
and vision by key individuals.60 Other factors include a legal framework that 
enables adaptive management; adequate funding for pursuing adaptive 
management; adequate monitoring, information flows, and knowledge 
sources; and “a venue for collaboration.”61 Thus, beyond financial resources 
and legal authority to act, a key element of adaptive governance is having 
invested leadership that can galvanize stakeholders and facilitate 
communication. 
Highlighting the mismatched pace between theory and practice at the 
federal level, actual mitigation initiatives to date have been controversial and 
of limited impact, with some notable exceptions. In Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,62 the Supreme Court of the United States 
directed EPA to regulate carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act63 if EPA found they contribute to climate change.64 EPA’s main 
effort to pursue that implementation, the CPP, is, as of this writing, the 
subject of “monster litigation” involving more than two dozen states, 
agencies, and other groups.65 The Obama Administration did achieve a major 
mitigation victory when EPA, in partnership with the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, successfully promulgated standards to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and improve fuel economy for light-duty 
vehicles—first for model years 2012–2016, then for model years 2017 and 
beyond.66 
	
 59  Id. at 99. 
 60  Id. at 98–99; Gardner, supra note 40, at 269. 
 61  Gardner, supra note 40, at 269. 
 62  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 63  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 64  Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 532. 
 65  Ellen M. Gilmer, Both Sides Claim Upper Hand after “Complete Surprise” from Court, 
ENERGYWIRE (May 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/D7AB-J4BE; accord Patrick McGinley, Collateral 
Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and Social Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. 
ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 305, 314 (2013) [hereinafter McGinley, Collateral Damage]; Carl 
Pope, 5 Things to Remember About Obama’s Clean Power Plan Rule, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 
2014), https://perma.cc/CEU9-2QFA; Sign the Petition: EPA Should Withdraw Clean Power Plan 
Rule, NAT’L TAXPAYERS UNION, https://perma.cc/JV2G-98K9 (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 66  Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 
86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts 523, 531, 533, 536, 537); 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 
62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts 523, 531, 533, 536, 
537); John M. Broder, Limits Set on Pollution from Autos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at B1. The 
Supreme Court upheld some of EPA’s asserted authority to regulate greenhouse gases emitted 
by motor vehicles. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 
(2014). For a broader discussion of regulation of greenhouse gases, see generally Alex Ritchie, 
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Despite some progress, scholars agree that attempted and existing 
regulations are insufficient to achieve meaningful climate mitigation goals.67 
Ruhl additionally notes that “the policy world’s fixation on achieving, or 
blocking, federal greenhouse gas emission legislation as part of our national 
strategy for climate change mitigation has contributed to our neglect of 
national policy for climate change adaptation.”68 
Federal adaptation efforts have quietly gained ground and may be 
positioned for a smoother path than mitigation if subsequent administrations 
continue to pursue them. In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 
13,653 which directed agencies to undertake vulnerability assessments and 
planning for adaptation.69 The Obama Administration also created seven 
Regional Climate Hubs, which involve partnerships among the United States 
Department of Agriculture, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and the United States Department of the Interior, among 
other entities.70 Adaptation may be a more feasible and less controversial 
pursuit than mitigation for a variety of reasons. Adaptation offers more 
immediate rewards than efforts to tackle air pollution because the effects 
can be seen and enjoyed right away.71 Further, because of this smaller, more 
immediate scale, there is less incentive for organized political opposition to 
adaptation, as opposed to mitigation, where large industries may incur costs 
for compliance. However, as of 2015, “[m]ost agencies [we]re in formative 
stages of their assessments and strategic planning” and few examples 
existed of day-to-day agency activities that were different as a result of their 
explicit adaptation efforts.72 
Another interesting and important aspect of adaptation is that, by its 
nature, it encompasses a variety of jurisdictions, government levels, and 
legal disciplines that have traditionally been treated as distinct from one 
another.73 Existing measures that were created before climate science was 
recognized will, in practice, continue to be drawn upon as part of efforts to 
manage the effects of climate change.74 These measures may range from the 
	
Scattered and Dissonant: The Clean Air Act, Greenhouse Gases, and Implications for the Oil and 
Gas Industry, 43 ENVTL. L. 461 (2013). 
 67  E.g., Parker-Flynn, supra note 12, at 16; Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, 
at 369. 
 68  Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 365–66. 
 69  Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, Exec. Order No. 13,653, 
§ 5, 3 C.F.R. at 330, 333 (2014). 
 70  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Secretary Vilsack Announces Regional Hubs to Help 
Agriculture, Forestry Mitigate the Impacts of a Changing Climate (Feb. 4, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/TAA3-BGMA. 
 71  Parker-Flynn, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
 72  JANE A. LEGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43915, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION BY 
FEDERAL AGENCIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PLANS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2015). 
 73  Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 390; see also Parker-Flynn, supra 
note 12, at 21–22 (discussing “mainstreaming, a process whereby adaptation measures are 
integrated into some aspect of related government policy such as water management, disaster 
preparedness, and emergency planning or land-use planning” (citations omitted)). 
 74  See Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 433 (“Participating in, rather than 
against, the complex policy mix that will form around adaptation keeps environmental concerns 
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smallest municipal stormwater management scheme to a vast forestry 
management plan. This Article therefore treats certain legal mechanisms, 
such as the National Wildlife Refuge Act and strategies to minimize human 
conflict, as natural parts of climate adaptation policy, even if they were not 
created with that intent. 
For effective SES governance, room remains to inform what works, 
what does not, and what adjustments can be made in the legal frameworks 
seeking to operationalize complexity and resilience theory. Craig points out 
that 
the incorporation of complexity theory into environmental and natural 
resources law scholarship remains nascent, albeit growing, especially from the 
perspective of finding an adequate governance system for climate change 
adaptation. . . . [W]ork remains to be done . . . [and] much of environmental and 
natural resources law remain based in paradigms of complicatedness, 
predictability, and stationarity . . . an increasingly problematic mismatch in a 
climate change era.75 
The discussion below seeks to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on 
effective resilience-based governance of SESs. To that end, the next section 
examines a social issue that arises in SESs of various scales and poses 
conflicts to effective governance: a bitter, longstanding rift between labor 
and environmental interests. 
III. THE WORK–ENVIRONMENT RIFT: CURRENT MANIFESTATIONS 
AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES 
A. Preliminary Note on Definitions, Demographics, and Methodology 
The labor landscape today is dramatically different from the one of 
sixty years ago. Union membership has seen major declines for decades and 
is currently estimated at about 11% of workers.76 Further, while the concept 
of the “American worker” tends to bring to mind for many an image of a 
white, male factory laborer, in fact, a substantial proportion of American 
workers today are women, and particularly women of color, in the service 
industry.77 
This Article is therefore not an inquiry into “the working class,” the full 
spectrum of modern laborers, or any modern labor movement. Rather, it is 
	
within the dialogue, not an afterthought . . . . And recalibrating how environmental law uses 
instruments and institutions to fulfill its objectives will allow it to keep pace with the demand 
for an adaptive adaptation policy.”). 
 75  Craig, Learning to Think, supra note 33, at 93, 101–02. 
 76  Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members Summary 
(Jan 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/96FC-ZQYJ (reporting that the union membership rate in 2016 
was 10.7%). 
 77  Amanda Marcotte, Who’s Behind the Fast Food Strikes? Working Women, SLATE: 
XXFACTOR (Sept. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/3J55-3X2K. 
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primarily an examination of residents of rural areas who have expressed 
some kind of work-related entitlement to the natural resources proximal to 
them. The inquiry draws upon disciplines that use hybrid methodologies 
combining traditional legal scholarship with qualitative analyses typically 
associated with sociology or anthropology.78 Fields that use similar 
interdisciplinary methods and synthesized discussions of space, place, scale, 
law, power, and inequality include legal geographies, environmental justice, 
and social movements theory.79 
While not the face of modern labor, the demographic of interest here is 
strongly “work-identified.”80 The perceived entitlements to proximal natural 
resources are linked to the desire for the continuation of historical economic 
activity. Thus, the longstanding work–environment rift discussed below is 
relevant to understanding this group’s alienation from government and 
environmentalism. Because “labor” tends to refer to the days of a more 
cohesive workforce and the age of unions, this section uses “work” as its 
default term, to serve as a more malleable label that did apply in the era of 
unions, but applies to unions and in other contexts today. 
B. The Work–Environment Rift 
Political scientists, sociologists, and advocates on both sides have 
remarked upon the persistent and counterintuitive divide between work-
	
 78  Pruitt & Sobczynski at 3, at 327. 
 79  Id.; see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature 
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2001) (while there is a gap between legal 
scholarship and social movement literature, “these two fields display considerable overlap in 
both their subject matter and their methodology; they study the same phenomena and draw on 
the same theoretical sources in doing so. Yet, they communicate only fitfully, if at all, with one 
another. . . . [S]ocial movement scholars study the way these movements are formed, organized, 
and operated, while legal scholars study the movements’ specific effect on the decisions of 
courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. . . . [L]egal scholarship observes and analyzes 
the influence and impact of social movements, but tends to ignore their origins. . . . [L]egal 
scholars have much to gain from broadening their perspective and making contact with the 
social movements literature.”); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of “Moo Ha Ha”: A Tribute to 
Keith Aoki’s Role in Developing Critical Legal Geography, 90 OR. L. REV. 1233 1238–39 (2012) 
(“Although law and geography is still an underdeveloped intersection as compared to law and 
economics or law and political science, interdisciplinary work in this area has grown rapidly 
over the last thirty years. . . . A wide range of law and geography scholars . . . have been 
exploring the ways in which geographic assumptions and unequal spatialization of power 
constitute and are constituted by law, often building upon . . . earlier law and geography work 
and Foucault’s relatively brief commentary on the value of space.”); Lisa R. Pruitt, The Rural 
Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space, in THE EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHY 190, 190–91 (Irus Braverman et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Pruitt, Space Tames]; cf. 
Peter M. Rosset & Maria Elena Martínez-Torres, Rural Social Movements and Agroecology: 
Context, Theory, and Process, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 3, 2012, art. 17, at 1 (describing rural 
social movements as driven in part by efforts to gain autonomy and control over territory). 
 80  Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 802 
(2011) [hereinafter Pruitt, Class Culture Wars]. 
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related interests and environmental interests.81 The absence of alliances 
between workers’ advocates and environmental advocates—which 
sometimes blossoms fully into adversarial relations—fascinates 
commentators because, on its face, it seems like these two groups should be 
naturally aligned. Environmental regulation should appeal to workers 
because of benefits such as enhanced workplace safety and workers’ 
protections should appeal to environmentalists as part of a progressive 
agenda to benefit the greater good. Yet the rift has been a recurring theme in 
environmental debates since the birth of the environmental movement.82 It 
behooves us to dig deeper into the issue from a policy standpoint, as 
potential pathways to help bridge this rift could translate to potential 
pathways for more cohesive, better informed climate governance. 
A starting point could be to critique the environmental movement. The 
movement has been criticized for addressing the concerns of social elites 
and overlooking the interests of people of color, for instance.83 Although 
counterexamples abound, the environmental movement has been called a 
“white, middle-class phenomenon,”84 or otherwise out of touch with the 
complexities of modern society.85 Self-described environmentalist Gregory 
Mengel argues that the environmental movement “is shaped by 
unacknowledged race and class privilege, such that it has simply not been 
able to make itself relevant to people of color and low income white 
people.”86 He attributes these shortcomings to the fact that traditional 
concern for preservation and veneration for the wild and 
[e]ven appeals to scientifically legitimate concerns such as biodiversity and 
ecosystem integrity often tap into . . . deeper emotional currents, which are 
rooted in a Romantic or aesthetic attitude, and which are more typical of city 
dwellers who conceive their relationship to the natural world in terms of 
leisure outdoor activities. 
	
 81  E.g., BRIAN K. OBACH, LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: THE QUEST FOR 
COMMON GROUND 9 (2004). 
 82  See id. at 10. 
 83  Gregory Mengel, Race and Class Privilege in the Environmental Movement, PACHAMAMA 
ALL. (Sept. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/63EZ-SGFJ. 
 84  Id. See generally Nannette Jolivette Brown, The Many Faces of Environmental Justice: 
Which One Speaks the Truth?, 56 LA. B.J. 420, 421 (2009) (discussing the tension between the 
civil rights movement and the environmental movement); Stephanie Tai, Environmental 
Hazards and the Richmond Laotian American Community: A Case Study in Environmental 
Justice, 6 ASIAN AM. L.J. 189 (1999) (discussing how environmental justice movement has 
devoted little attention to cultural norms’ relationships with exposure to environmental 
hazards); Robert R.M. Verchick, In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental 
Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23 (1996) (using a feminist lens to examine the relationship 
between biases such as sexism, racism, and classism in the environmental justice movement). 
 85  MICHAEL SHELLEBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: GLOBAL 
WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD (2004), https://perma.cc/3AZ6-K54S. 
 86  Mengel, supra note 83. 
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People who depend directly on nature for their livelihood . . . are 
understandably unmoved by the Romantic appeals of traditional 
preservationism.87 
Mengel also points to conferring moral weight to “what amounts to luxury 
consumption”—such as “buying local” or driving a hybrid car—“despite the 
fact that the ability to make such choices relies on the systemic unearned 
privileges that go with being white and middle-class in the U.S.”88 
Mengel similarly notes that those who do not meet accepted 
environmental standards “may be seen as somehow different or deficient.”89 
Lisa Pruitt and Linda Sobczynski have examined this theme in their analysis 
of a case study where a high-polluting concentrated animal feeding 
operation (CAFO) was sited “in a sparsely populated, highly impoverished 
county in the Ozark highlands.”90 In 2014, a national environmental nonprofit 
sought an injunction of federal loan guarantees for the CAFO, citing 
noncompliance with the National Environmental Policy Act91 and the 
Endangered Species Act92 (ESA).93 Pruitt and Sobczynski noted the plaintiffs’ 
exclusion of a narrative highlighting the effects of the CAFO on the 
community, positing that “the conservation-oriented plaintiffs and attorneys 
may have viewed [nearby] poor white residents as transgressing 
wilderness—as having trashed pristine nature by their very presence—and 
thus as unworthy of advocacy.”94 More generally, Pruitt has argued that 
liberal elites—presumably, the shapers of environmental law and 
advocacy—“shun and ridicule the white working class, [and] similarly 
express disdain for rural and small-town residents.”95 
Environmental sociologist Stefania Barca has described the work–
environment rift as “the classical opposition between Marxism and 
environmentalism, which has formed a serious impediment to possible 
alliances and coalitions between the two movements at the political level.”96 
However, she and others challenge the common wisdom that 
	
 87  Id. The popular film Deliverance (its damaging and inaccurate portrayal of Appalachia 
set aside for the moment) illustrates this idea somewhat: the city-dwelling visitors to a wild 
region revere its natural purity, but the “hillbilly” local residents do not seem to share their 
enthusiasm. DELIVERANCE (Warner Bros. 1972). 
 88  Mengel, supra note 83. A South Park episode that aired in 2006 provides a good 
illustration of this cultural critique’s appearance in pop culture. People who drive Priuses are 
portrayed as self-righteous, self-appointed heroes. Rather than polluting the atmosphere with 
smog, the plot involves the Prius drivers polluting the air with a fictional substance called 
“smug.” South Park: Smug Alert! (Comedy Central television broadcast Mar. 29, 2006). 
 89  Mengel, supra note 83. 
 90  Pruitt & Sobczynski, supra note 3, at 327. This occurred in Newton County, Arkansas. Id.  
 91  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). 
 92  Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 93  Pruitt & Sobczynski, supra note 3, at 327. 
 94  Id. at 326. See generally NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR UNTOLD HISTORY 
OF CLASS IN AMERICA (2016) (discussing the “white trash” trope throughout American history). 
 95  Pruitt, Class Culture Wars, supra note 80, at 768 (footnote omitted). 
 96  Stefania Barca, On Working-Class Environmentalism: A Historical and Transnational 
Overview, INTERFACE, Nov. 2012, at 61, 64. 
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environmentalist sympathies do not make meaningful manifestations among 
working class groups. Passage of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act,97 for instance, has been attributed to a “coalition between oil, chemical, 
atomic, steel and farm workers unions with some environmental 
organizations.”98 Barca also notes the example of “the alliance between 
environmentalists and trade unionists that arose spontaneously in the streets 
of Seattle, with the slogan ‘Teamsters and Turtles’, during the 1999 protests 
against the [World Trade Organization].”99 
Barca argues that “[e]nvironmentalism . . . is a misleading unifying label, 
that tends to hide the existence of nonmainstream varieties of 
environmental struggle, which are the object of various forms of cultural, 
social and political silencing.”100 She notes that “[e]mpirical research has 
demonstrated how the subaltern classes, manual workers, indigenous 
peoples and the poor in general are often the first to defend the environment 
in which they work and live, or from which they get their livelihood.”101 In To 
Save the Land and the People, for instance, Chad Montrie documents the 
under-discussed history of popular opposition to surface coal mining in 
Appalachia.102 He argues that “the campaign to abolish stripping was 
primarily a movement of farmers and working people of various sorts, 
originating at the local level.”103 He noted the need to call attention “to the 
role played by common folk in the conservation, preservation, and 
environmental movements.”104 
The environmental justice movement has pursued the intersection of 
environmentalism, race, and class. Barca argues that it has shifted 
environmentalism “towards a better understanding of the connections 
between work and the environment.”105 The environmental justice movement 
is concerned with the unequal distribution of social costs between different 
human groups according to distinctions of class, race/ethnicity, and spatial 
placement. Environmental injustice is strongly related to space, i.e. to the 
unequal distribution of pollution and environmental degradation at local, 
national or transnational level: distinctions such as urban/rural, center-
periphery or north-south are of primary relevance for the understanding of 
environmental injustice.106 
Nevertheless, while the environmental justice movement has brought 
work and environmental concerns together somewhat, the movement has 
	
 97  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012). 
 98  Barca, supra note 96, at 67. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 64. 
 101  Id. at 65.  
 102  See generally CHAD MONTRIE, TO SAVE THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF 
OPPOSITION TO SURFACE COAL MINING IN APPALACHIA (2003). 
 103  Id. at 3. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Barca, supra note 96, at 62. 
 106  Id. at 65 (citations omitted). 
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struggled to influence mainstream policymaking, and conservation and 
environmental justice advocacy efforts remain largely distinct.107 Similarly, 
Barca acknowledges that even in the progressive developments of the 1960s 
and 1970s, just as “workplace and social justice issues remained external”108 
to environmentalists’ mission, so too did the labor movement remain “bound 
by union acceptance of the structure of industry decision making.”109 
Sociologist Brian Obach has conducted one of the most in-depth 
inquiries into the work–environment rift in his book, Labor and the 
Environmental Movement: The Quest for Common Ground. Like Barca, he 
notes that although examples exist of close cooperation between unions and 
environmentalists, “[i]n many cases the ties between these two movements 
are tenuous. . . . Despite examples of intermittent collaboration, there has 
also been a great deal of conflict between environmental and union interests 
over the decades.”110 According to Obach, 
Some theorists have noted that labor and environmental movement 
participants face particular difficulties [when attempting to collaborate] 
because of the cultural differences that divide [them]. Middle-class 
professionals dominate the environmental movement and they are embedded 
in a different cultural milieu than blue-collar workers. The views of members 
of these two groups on political action, the nature of work, organizational 
functioning, the basis of knowledge, and the role of nature differ in some 
important ways.111 
However, critical to this discussion, Obach argues that workers do not 
tend to be at the forefront of anti-environmental initiatives; rather, they are 
more likely to be recruited by industry. He says: 
[W]orkers are not typically the lead opponents of environmental measures. . . . 
Environmental movement organizations are most commonly pitted against 
private-industry executives who wish to avoid the costs and constraints of 
environmental regulation. . . . Employers seek to enlist workers to rally against 
environmental measures by using the threat that losses or decreases in profit 
suffered as a result of [environmental measures] may result in layoffs or a 
complete shutdown. Knowing that a threat to corporate profits will not move 
the public, a more sympathetic victim is necessary to win public support, and 
workers are the obvious group to serve this purpose. Industry opponents of 
environmental measures will typically fade into the background and carry on 
low-profile lobbying while workers are presented as the public face of 
environmental opposition. Often cast as issues of jobs versus the environment, 
these conflicts have captured the most attention and have helped to shape the 
	
 107  Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 149, 153 (2013). 
 108  Barca, supra note 96, at 69. 
 109  Id. (quoting ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 372 (rev. ed. 2005)). 
 110  OBACH, supra note 81, at 9. 
 111  Id. at 20 (citations omitted). 
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perception that environmental protection is antithetical to economic 
expansion, job preservation, and the interests of workers generally.112 
Thus, while environmentalists and workers’ advocates often come 
down on opposite sides of environmental issues, they are not necessarily 
natural enemies. Rather, “the interests of workers become tied to those of 
their employers, at least in terms of preserving the enterprise that provides 
profit for one and wages for the other.”113 The discussion in the next section 
seeks to illustrate this phenomenon, its effects on federal law, and other 
relevant angles, including critical differences between urban and rural life. 
C. Two Anti-Environmental, Anti-Federal Social Movements 
This section describes two social movements, then assesses the 
influences that drive them and their significance to federal climate policy. 
These two movements were selected based on their strong rhetoric in 
opposition to the federal government alongside strong rhetoric in opposition 
to environmental regulation. The movements’ political and corporate 
influences are set aside for this discussion. Of interest here is a populist 
embrace of the symbolism of environmental regulation as anathema to 
workers’ well-being, and concomitant manifestations of alienation within a 
demographic that has embraced that symbol. 
These movements are not the first time that “jobs versus environment” 
rhetoric has been used. This dichotomy is a classic trope in environmental 
debates.114 However, this particular examination is warranted for several 
reasons. First, discussion of the jobs–environment dichotomy has been more 
nuanced in recent years.115 While it is often used as political propaganda, for 
individual workers, there may be truth to support the outrage in some 
instances.116 These specific movements also appear frequently in the public 
	
 112  Id. at 9–10 (citations omitted). 
 113  Id. at 11. 
 114  Alex Geisinger, Uncovering the Myth of a Jobs/Nature Trade-Off, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
115, 116 (2001). 
 115  E.g., Motoko Rich & John Broder, A Debate Arises on Job Creation and Environment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at B1; Steve Inskeep, Video and Transcript: NPR’s Interview with 
President Obama, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/4QYP-ASDB (statement of 
President Obama) (“But that’s not to suggest that everybody who objects to my policies may not 
have perfectly good reasons for it. If you are living in a town that historically has relied on coal 
and you see coal jobs diminishing, you probably are going to be more susceptible to the 
argument that I’ve been wiping out the economy in your area.”). 
 116  The Environmental Law Collaborative began a robust examination of relevant themes 
with its 2016 initiative exploring “Zero-Sum Environmentalism.” See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, 
Zero Sum Games in Pollution Control: The Games We Create Versus the Games We Discover 
(Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 200 Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Craig, Zero Sum], 
https://perma.cc/PV8B-AQK5; James E. Salzman, Strategies for Zero Sum Challenges, (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-10, Feb. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/6D2Y-SBBE; 
J.B. Ruhl, Seeing Past the Zero Sum Game in Environmental Policy – Harder Than It Looks 
(Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Ruhl, Zero Sum] (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/9DBL-
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discourse, and they are two among the most prominent anti-environmental 
campaigns of the current climate change era. Most urgently, they have both 
been extreme enough in one respect or another so as to brush up against 
undermining the country’s political stability.117 Finally, combined, these 
regions and movements span a significant portion of the country—but 
mostly “flyover country” that does not receive as much attention as other 
regions. In light of these movements’ influence on public sentiments and 
policymaking, as scholars continue to grapple with how the law must be 
restructured, the discourse should address how the law can account for 
these and comparable natural resource-related social issues that continue to 
catalyze conflict. 
1. The Land Transfer Movement 
The Land Transfer Movement refers to the joint and parallel efforts of 
legislators, groups, and individuals committed to transferring public lands in 
the west from federal ownership to the states.118 Two main rationales are 
advanced to support these efforts. First, supporters argue that current 
patterns of federal ownership are “unconstitutional.”119 The precise 
parameters of this alleged unconstitutionality are not necessarily clear or 
consistent. Framed from another angle, some advocates insist that the 
federal government has broken a promise to states that federal ownership 
would be phased out when territories entered into statehood.120 In addition, 
supporters assert that “states are dedicated to multiple-use management and 
would be more efficient owners,” as opposed to the federal government’s 
supposed mismanagement of the land.121 
A robust body of interdisciplinary scholarship has rejected these 
assertions. Constitutional law scholars reject sympathizers’ constitutional 
	
WBYF; see also Geisinger, supra note 114, at 137 (arguing that environmental regulation does 
not cause net job losses at the societal level). 
 117  Hoffmann, supra note 7, at 27 (discussing standoffs between ranchers and federal land 
managers as compromising the rule of law). 
 118  See id. at 22; see also Robert B. Keiter & John C. Ruple, The Transfer of Public Lands 
Movement: Taking the ‘Public’ Out of Public Lands 1 (S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law Research Paper 
No. 99, 2015) (describing and critiquing changes if transfer proponents succeed). 
 119  COAL. OF W. STATES, https://perma.cc/VSA2-7HNY (last visited Feb. 25, 2017); see also 
Richard D. Clayton, Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 
1980 UTAH L. REV. 505, 516–25 (1980) (analyzing certain western state laws, and describing and 
critiquing constitutionally rooted arguments against federal control of public lands). 
 120  Kochan, supra note 7, at 1134, 1146–47. 
 121  Keiter & Ruple, supra note 118, at 1; accord Andrea Collins, To Transfer or Not to 
Transfer, That Is the Question: An Analysis of Public Lands Title in the West, 76 MONT. L. REV. 
309, 324 (2015) (“Advocates believe states’ natural resources are being mismanaged and feel 
each state deserves a larger piece of the pie.”); Richard Lee Simmons, Comment, The Sale of 
Our Land: A Look at Public Land Transfers, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1068, 1068 (2015) 
(“Supporters of the land transfer argue that it would improve public access, generate more 
economic growth, and better protect the environment.”); Robert H. Nelson, States Should Take 
Control of Our Outmoded Public Land System, CONVERSATION (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/K7GB-JB4W. 
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arguments.122 Natural resources scholars reject more pragmatism- or 
management-based arguments for a mass land transfer.123 Environmental law 
scholars note the potential for even worse environmental degradation on 
western lands and the likely increase in privatization that would accompany 
state ownership.124 Most recently, Michael Blumm and Olivier Jamin have 
discussed the Malheur occupation in the context of this larger movement, 
deeming the occupation “the latest of a long history of unsuccessful 
opposition against the Constitution’s Property Clause” and warning that 
divestiture would be a radical reshaping of public lands law.125 
The military branch of the movement dates back to the so-called 
Sagebrush Rebellion. The Sagebrush Rebellion arose as a backlash to the 
wave of federal environmental and conservation legislation passed in the 
1970s, such as the Federal Land Policy and Management Act126 (FLPMA).127 In 
the movement’s initial wave, 
livestock operators—after years of growing federal interference with their 
activities . . . righteously or otherwise, banded together to beat back the rapidly 
tightening tentacles (again, righteous or not depending on your preferences) of 
the federal government. Asserting ancient and highly questionabl[e] 
entitlements, the rebels sought to ‘return’ to state governments federal lands 
increasingly regulated by the federal government.128 
Throughout the past several decades, the movement, whose tactics have 
involved bombings and other armed protests,129 has overlapped somewhat 
with a rise in right-wing militias who have a variety of ideological gripes with 
	
 122  Les Zaitz, Demands by Oregon Standoff Leaders Defy Logic and Law, Authorities Say, 
OREGONIAN (Jan. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/38JS-E57Y. 
 123  E.g., Keiter & Ruple, supra note 118, at 1. 
 124  E.g., Hillary M. Hoffmann, The Flawed Law and Economics of Federal Land Seizure 
Statutes, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2015, at 34, 37; Simmons, supra note 121, at 1068. 
 125  Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons 
from the Malheur Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 54), 
https://perma.cc/STL9-C9SM. 
 126  Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2012). 
 127  See Marshall Swearingen & Kate Schimel, Timeline: A Brief History of the Sagebrush 
Rebellion, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/3CJX-QQ6Z (FLPMA ended 
homesteading in the west and established more intensive management of federal lands).  
 128  Sally Fairfax, Old Recipes for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 968–69 (1982). Other 
movements and groups with similar ideology have ebbed and flowed alongside the Sagebrush 
Rebellion. See Swearingen & Schimel, supra note 127 (discussing “Posse Comitatus, a 
movement whose members hold the county sheriff to be the highest law of the land”); 
Hoffmann, supra note 7, at 22 (“In the 1980s and 1990s, the Sagebrush Rebellion was 
repackaged and reinvigorated as the ‘County Supremacy,’ or ‘County Home Rule,’ Movement.”). 
 129  Robin Bravender, Bundys Fuel ‘Round Two’ of Sagebrush Rebellion, GREENWIRE (Jan. 6, 
2016), https://perma.cc/CM6C-SY9B. 
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the federal government.130 Violence toward federal land managers, not all of 
which is movement-motivated, remains more common than many realize.131 
The Rebellion gained some legitimacy in the public eye when Ronald 
Reagan, “a self-proclaimed Sagebrush rebel,” became president in 1981.132 
The seed for its modern political rebirth appears to have been planted with 
Utah’s passage of H.B. 148 in 2012,133 which sought to transfer 31.2 million 
acres of federal public land to Utah.134 H.B. 148 gave the federal government 
a deadline of December 31, 2014, to “extinguish title” to more than 20 million 
acres.135 Today, lawmakers from nine western states regularly introduce bills 
seeking to unravel federal ownership of public lands.136 In 2014, the national 
Republican Party made a call for state ownership of federal lands part of its 
	
 130  Michael Kimmel & Abby L. Ferber, “White Men Are This Nation:” Right-Wing Militias and 
the Restoration of Rural American Masculinity, 65 RURAL SOC. 582, 586 (2000). 
 131  This includes standoffs such as Cliven Bundy’s in March 2014. See Hoffmann, supra note 
7, at 14 (“The national news media descended as soon as word spread that weapons and private 
militias were involved, in pursuit of a modern day Wild West story.”). But receiving far less 
attention than the Bundys is “a long history of violence toward federal public lands officers.” 
Wiles, supra note 5. High Country News calls this trend “an ominous pattern of hostility toward 
government employees.” Ray Ring & Marshall Swearingen, Defuse the West: Public-Land 
Employees are Easy Targets for a Violent, Government-Hating Fringe, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 
(Oct. 27, 2014), https://perma.cc/V9WU-7H67 (describing that all over the west, people have 
threatened, assaulted, yelled bigoted slurs toward, shot at, and otherwise endangered public 
employees, including by “hurling firebombs”). These incidents average from one to a few dozen 
confrontations per year and span from Texas to Colorado to Washington to Alaska; targets have 
included employees of BLM, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park 
Service, which are sub-agencies of the United States Department of the Interior, as well as the 
Forest Service, a subagency of the United States Department of Agriculture. Elizabeth G. Daerr, 
Study Finds Park Rangers Facing Increased Violence: Fugitives are Drawn to Isolation of Parks, 
Putting Rangers At Risk, NAT’L PARKS, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 12, 12–13; Ring & Swearingen, supra; 
Wiles, supra note 5. Some of the violence does not stem from animosity toward federal 
employees themselves, but rather, because public employees are tasked with policing those 
who would use the cover of vast federal wilderness to flee law enforcement or pursue illegal 
activities such as drug trafficking. See Daerr, supra, at 12–14. From a broader perspective, 
Hillary Hoffmann argues that these conflicts result from resource scarcity and “are nothing new 
to natural resources scholars, regional historians, or local residents. Now, the cycle includes a 
new variable: the uncertainties associated with climate change.” Hoffmann, supra note 7, at 15 
(footnote omitted). 
 132  Bravender, supra note 129 (noting that during the 1980 presidential election campaign, 
Ronald Reagan said “count me in as a rebel” while campaigning in Utah). 
 133  Transfer of Public Lands Act, 2012 Utah Laws 1811 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §63L-6-
101 to -104 (West 2016)). 
 134  Simmons, supra note 121, at 1068; see also Collins, supra note 121, at 310 (describing the 
movement as “recently revitalized”). 
 135  § 3, 2012 Utah Laws at 1812 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §63L-6-103(1) (West 2016)); 
Kochan, supra note 7, at 1135. 
 136  E.g., Utah Test and Training Range Encroachment Prevention and Temporary Closure 
Act, H.R. 4579, 114th Cong. (2016); Bolts Ditch Access and Use Act, H.R. 4510, 114th Cong. 
(2016); Abby Kessler, Land Management Bills Spark Heated Debate, E&E DAILY (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/XN4A-UWGU; Scott Streater, Panel Grills Tidwell on Rancher Animosity, 
Federal Ownership, E&E DAILY (Feb. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/5DTA-7RTA. 
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platform.137 The Bundys are also credited with starting “round two of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion.”138 
The Land Transfer Movement has thus evolved into far more than a 
fringe campaign.139 The movement’s rationales appeal to a substantial faction 
of western residents despite scholarly rejection of them.140 A small, 
bipartisan public opinion poll conducted in 2014 in eight western mountain 
states found that a majority of Utah residents (52%) and a plurality of 
Wyoming residents favored a transfer of public lands to the states.141 Across 
the states, a slight majority (54%) of people identifying as conservative 
Republicans supported a mass transfer.142 The survey concluded that a 
majority of overall residents would vote in opposition to a formal transfer 
proposal.143 Nonetheless, the activities of sympathetic western legislators 
and other Bundy-esque, Sagebrush Rebel figures reveal a persistent, 
concerted, and impactful effort to transfer federal lands to state 
ownership.144 Similarly, despite the extremeness of the occupation at 
Malheur, the occupiers found sympathizers all over the country.145 In October 
2016, an Oregon jury’s surprising acquittal of Ammon and Ryan Bundy and 
five other occupiers prompted arguments that law enforcement and the 
justice system treated them leniently, and that they would have received far 
harsher treatment if they were black, Muslim, or Native American.146 
	
 137  REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 21–22 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/Y2XU-X2YC. 
 138  Bravender, supra note 129. 
 139  See, e.g., Richard M. Mollison & Richard W. Eddy, Jr., The Sagebrush Rebellion: A 
Simplistic Response to the Complex Problems of Federal Land Management, 19 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 97, 97 (1982) (describing Sagebrush Rebellion as “a political movement with widespread 
support in several western states”). 
 140  See, e.g., Collins, supra note 121, at 323 (“[T]he transfer movement is alive and well in 
Montana.”). 
 141  Memorandum from Lori Weigel, Pub. Opinion Strategies & David Metz, FM3 on Western 
Voter Attitudes Toward Management of Public Lands to Interested Parties 2 (Sept. 23, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/6X37-WXRZ (describing Wyoming’s residents as “divided”). The survey 
included Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming—this 
region substantially overlaps the Great Basin. Id. at 1. In a 2015 poll, 71% of Arizona residents 
believed public lands belonged to country as a whole. Simmons, supra note 121, at 1071. 
Another survey showed that residents of almost all western states except Utah do not want 
federal lands transferred to the states. Ralph Maughan, Survey: Westerners Don’t Want State 
Control of Public Lands, WILDLIFE NEWS (Sept. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/L26V-PUM6. 
 142  Weigel & Metz, supra note 141, at 2. 
 143  Id. at 5. 
 144  See generally John Sepulvado, GOP Politicians Planned and Participated in Key Aspects 
of Refuge Occupation, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Mar. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/WM9T-MAA6. 
 145  Lynne Palombo, Oregon Standoff: Occupiers and Sympathizers Revealed, OREGONIAN 
(Mar. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/7MC5-Y8N8. 
 146  Courtney Sherwood & Kirk Johnson, U.S. Jury Acquits All Defendants in Refuge Siege, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct 28, 2016, at A1; see also Bradley W. Parks, 41 Days and 8 Months Later: 
Dissecting the Oregon Standoff Trial, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Oct. 30, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/QK6G-H8H9 (noting that the acquittal coincided with the forcible removal of 
indigenous protesters of Dakota Access pipeline and came weeks after civil rights activists in 
Portland were pepper-sprayed and forcibly removed from City Hall by police); Chauncey 
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The occupation involved political as well as militant tactics. Although 
they received less attention than the occupiers, several lawmakers 
associated with the Coalition of Western States (COWS)—whose platform is 
dedicated to “stopping Government overreach”147—went to Malheur despite 
opposition from local officials.148 They shared information with the 
protestors, negotiated on their behalf, and attempted to persuade federal 
representatives to compromise by ceding control of federal lands.149 In a 
recorded phone conversation, Nevada Assemblywoman Michele Fiore, a 
member of COWS, went so far as to opine that the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) is a “bureaucratic agency of—basically—terrorism.”150 
Fiore and the Bundys illustrate the centrality to this movement of the 
belief that the federal government is the enemy. As Carol Rose articulates, 
“Sagebrush westerners sniff something like the odor of a royal domain in the 
special status of the federal public lands, a domain controlled by dictatorial 
bureaucrats who hold their region in a subordinate status.”151 She continues, 
[T]o some, like Cliven Bundy and his militiamen friends, the federal public 
lands are a constant reminder of the potential ascendancy of distant autocracy. 
It is not just the executive branch that could seemingly use the public lands to 
undermine the liberties of the people; it is the entire federal government.152 
Yet, milder manifestations of these sympathies exist among people who 
do not take up arms in their name. Many Americans are sympathetic to the 
notion that ranchers’ livelihoods and other local concerns should not be 
impinged by federal land use schemes. This anti-federal skepticism is 
intertwined with skepticism toward conservationism. In an explanation of 
ranchers’ “real grievances” after the Malheur occupation, Richard Miller 
opined: 
[I]t [is] unfair to let the Bundys stand in for the real grievances so many have 
[in this region]. Even for those that advocate for less grazing on public lands—I 
am probably among them—have to recognize that there are legitimate 
concerns of the ranchers that are trying to make a livelihood in these places. 
The Bundys have made a carnival side-show of these concerns. Even if we 
were to achieve some environmentally optimal result that eliminated grazing 
on public lands, some solution for the economies of these rural places must 
begin. Otherwise, the Bundys will be able to be martyrs in what is otherwise 
simply the enforcement of the rule of law we all expect and desire.153 
	
Devega, #CrimingWhileWhite Does Pay: Ammon Bundy and Weaponized White Privilege 
Prevails Again in Oregon, SALON (Oct. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/R4DK-98S4 (same). 
 147  COAL. OF W. STATES, supra note 119. 
 148  Sepulvado, supra note 144. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Rose, supra note 5, at 111. 
 152  Id. at 112. 
 153  Stephen R. Miller, As Bundy’s Malheur Takeover Ends, the Real Concerns of Sagebrush 
Country Ranchers Linger, LAND USE PROF BLOG (Jan. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/39DG-38BF. 
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The traditional environmental law response to these sympathies has 
been to emphasize the environmental degradation caused by overgrazing 
and seek to minimize overgrazing.154 The harmful effects of overgrazing are 
indeed glaring.155 In the interest of recognizing complex systems and 
minimizing alienation, however, perhaps there is both the need and the 
potential for the law to react with more nuance. 
2. The War on Coal Campaign 
In response to the Obama Administration’s efforts to regulate emissions 
from coal-fired power plants, legislators, industry proponents, and other 
groups, including unions, began decrying what they deemed a “War on Coal.” 
The term War on Coal “was coined by industry public relations specialists as 
a core principle of a multi-million dollar public relations campaign.”156 
Patrick McGinley describes the movement as an industry-financed initiative 
seeking “to persuade the public that increased costs engendered by stricter 
workplace safety and environmental regulations would destroy tens of 
thousands of jobs and the ‘way of life’ of coalfield families.”157 Like the Land 
Transfer Movement, the War on Coal campaign relies heavily on rhetoric 
decrying federal “overreach.”158 The campaign has involved a combination of 
think-tank studies, legislative reports, and other strategies to support 
allegations that various federal regulatory initiatives would dismantle the 
Appalachian coal industry, jeopardize jobs, and compromise energy security 
with “severe economic repercussions in rural communities.”159 McGinley 
argues that these strategies aggressively demonize environmentalists, 
policymakers, and others who would seek to regulate coal.160 
The Obama Administration did indeed take steps to regulate the coal 
industry, including enhanced workplace safety, waste disposal, and air 
pollution requirements.161 The alleged injustice behind these regulations, the 
War on Coal campaign maintains, is that coal remains a desirable energy 
source that should not be impeded: it keeps utility rates cheap, provides 
reliable fuel for electricity, and provides a source of economic activity on 
	
 154  E.g., Michelle M. Campana, Comment, Public Lands Grazing Fee Reform: Welfare 
Cowboys and Rolex Ranchers Wrangling with the New West, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 403, 458 
(2002). 
 155  See Mark Squillance, Grazing in Wilderness Areas, 44 ENVTL. L. 415, 419–21 (2014) 
(describing the harmful effects of overgrazing as a danger to native plants, stream hydrology, 
cryptogamic soil crusts, clean water, atmospheric dust particulate concentration, water supply, 
wildlife, archaeological sites, recreational resources, and aesthetic resources). 
 156  Patrick Charles McGinley, Climate Change and the War on Coal: Exploring the Dark 
Side, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 314 (2011) [hereinafter McGinley, Dark Side]. 
 157  McGinley, Collateral Damage, supra note 65, at 314. 
 158  E.g., EPA Mining Policies: Assault on Appalachian Jobs—Part II: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Water Res. & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 112th Cong. 8 
(May 11, 2011) (statement of Michael Carey, President, Ohio Coal Association). 
 159  McGinley, Collateral Damage, supra note 65, at 315, 334. 
 160  McGinley, Dark Side, supra note 156, at 317. 
 161  McGinley, Collateral Damage, supra note 65, at 315–16. 
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which many communities have historically depended.162 While many argue 
that the cheap price of natural gas led to coal’s demise,163 the limited 
regulation of natural gas to date could also be considered a policy choice.164 
The War on Coal campaign’s tactics have ranged from subtle to 
belligerent. On the belligerent end, politicians such as Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) have openly denounced the regulations as 
“war.”165 Discussing a subtler approach, sociologists Shannon Bell and 
Richard York characterize Friends of Coal, a self-described volunteer, 
grassroots organization, as a “countermovement to the environmental justice 
movement” manufactured by the West Virginia Coal Association, a trade 
group.166 Bell and York describe Friends of Coal’s tactics as “elaborate 
framing efforts to maintain and amplify coal’s status as the economic 
identity of West Virginia” in order to “counter the coal industry’s loss of 
citizens’ employment loyalties.”167 As with the Land Transfer Movement, 
grassroots sympathies, anti-federalism, job concerns, and the embrace of 
natural resource use all interact. Bill Raney, president of Friends of Coal, 
beseeches readers of their newsletter to “Call Washington . . . call the 
media . . . let them know you are a Friend of Coal and that you won’t stand 
by and let them steal your future.”168 
The War on Coal campaign appealed to many residents of struggling 
coalfield communities. For instance, in West Virginia’s 2014 midterm 
elections, one commentator argues: 
By maximizing divisive political rhetoric based on a presupposed War on Coal, 
an 80-year minority party was able to unseat multiple incumbent politicians 
and take control of the state political landscape. . . . [T]he War on Coal 
campaign appealed to the worldview of many West Virginia voters . . . [and] 
provided the easiest avenue for politicians to utilize divisive rhetoric in 
distracting voters from other, more relevant issues.169 
	
 162  E.g., Bruce Carlson, Opinion, The Political War on Coal, LEDGER INDEP. (Maysville, Ky.) 
(Apr. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/T378-42VW. 
 163  E.g., Jeff Brady, ‘America First’ Energy Plan Challenges Free Market Realities, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZD8T-PZ4H; see also Inskeep, supra note 115 (President 
Obama arguing that cheap natural gas contributed to coal’s decline rather than his 
Administration’s regulations). 
 164  Mayuca Salazar, Note, The North American Gas Markets and the Role of Regulatory 
Agencies (NEB/Canada, FERC/USA, and CRE/Mexico), 2 TEX. J. OIL & ENERGY L. 167, 170–79 
(tracing the history of natural gas regulation in the United States from light regulation to price 
control and then back to light regulation). 
 165  Coral Davenport, McConnell Wants States’ Help Against an Obama ‘War on Coal’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2015, at A1. 
 166  Shannon Elizabeth Bell & Richard York, Community Economic Identity: The Coal 
Industry and Ideology Construction in West Virginia, 75 RURAL SOC. 111, 126 (2010). 
 167  Id. at 126, 128. 
 168  Bill Raney, From the President’s Desk . . . The State of Coal, COAL FACTS (W. Va. Coal 
Ass’n, Charleston, W. Va.), 2010, at 5 (alterations in original), https://perma.cc/3J97-WK3Q.  
 169  Matthew Henry Burns, “War on Coal”: The Effects of Divisive Political Rhetoric on the 
Public Policy Process in West Virginia 79 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, American 
Public University), https://perma.cc/3C9P-XW9W. 
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Working class opposition to coal industry regulations has appeared 
strong: groups including the United Mine Workers Association, the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, boilermakers, 
steelworkers, and other workers have all opposed the regulations in one 
manner or another.170 
The War on Coal campaign differs in some significant ways from the 
Land Transfer Movement. The War on Coal campaign appears to lack a 
militant arm, for instance. It also concerns private land uses rather than 
public lands, although perhaps the parallel public resource relevant to the 
War on Coal would be air rather than land. However, the movements’ 
overarching themes are similar: misguided environmental regulation, 
imposed by an unsympathetic and distant federal government, is an 
illegitimate encroachment on the rights and way of life of workers and their 
communities. 
As of 2016, the campaign had come to a head as the “war” was actually 
being fought on a courtroom battlefield. The Attorney General of West 
Virginia, Patrick Morrissey, purported to “lead the fight against EPA’s rules 
regulating carbon dioxide emissions from new and existing coal-fired power 
plants.”171 West Virginia and twenty-eight other states and state agencies filed 
suit challenging the CPP and arguing that EPA had exceeded its authority in 
its attempt to require states to develop plans to reduce greenhouse gas 
emission from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units under the 
Clean Air Act.172 In February 2016, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs a 
stay of the implementation of the Plan, pending the resolution of legal 
challenges.173 Again, this battle is largely political. But it behooves us to ask: 
could the formulation of the CPP have done more to prevent this costly legal 
conflict? 
3. The Movements’ Commonalities and Significance 
The movements’ overarching theme—federal environmental regulation 
as an illegitimate encroachment on workers’ livelihoods—is clear. But they 
have more in common than even this. As an initial matter, each of these 
movements has a natural geospatial association, and the movements can 
best be understood by picturing them in specific regions. For the Land 
Transfer Movement, it is “the West.” The Great Basin, which encompasses 
most of Nevada, half of Utah, and parts of Wyoming, Idaho, Oregon, and 
	
 170  E.g., Jessica Lilly, UMWA Joins Coal Industry to Oppose EPA Regs, W. VA. PUB. 
BROADCASTING (June 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/P6AT-GS24; IBEW Sues EPA to Stop Clean 
Power Plan, INT’L BROTHERHOOD ELECTRICAL WORKERS (Nov. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/9SR3-
P5T7; EP Newswire, Boilermakers Union Leader Lambasts EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Offers 
Alternative, COUNT ON COAL (Feb. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/T3F7-VGPA. 
 171  Proposed EPA Rules for New and Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants, OFF. W. VA. ATT’Y 
GEN. PATRICK MORRISEY https://perma.cc/UFS8-N4FF (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 172  West Virginia v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015). Oral 
arguments in the case were held on September 27, 2016. Coral Davenport, Appeals Court Hears 
Challenge to Obama’s Climate Change Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2016, at A13. 
 173  Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016) (mem.). 
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California, can serve as an illustration.174 For the War on Coal Campaign, the 
central and northern parts of Appalachia—the heart of coal country 
including Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, West Virginia, western Maryland, 
Kentucky, southwest Virginia, and eastern Tennessee—can serve as an 
illustration.175 
Understanding these movements in relevant geospatial contexts helps 
to illustrate what drives them. First, each of these regions is characterized 
by a history of federal absenteeism and a reputation for lawlessness. In the 
West, in the decades from the 19th century’s fourfold increase in public land 
size through the 1970s, public land law was characterized by “near-total 
absence of government oversight of the frontier,” congressional ratification 
of “questionable land-grabbing behaviors,” and federal statutes, such as the 
1934 Taylor Grazing Act,176 that failed to meet their stated aims.177 Efforts 
since the 1970s to shift toward stewardship, conservation, and recreation 
have seen some success.178 However, many current or would-be users still 
insist upon an “open-access” model where government limitations on private 
uses are disfavored.179 To this day, the stewardship model remains half-
heartedly enforced.180 
	
 174  The Great Basin, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/6THL-E84H (last visited Feb. 25, 
2017). 
 175  Subregions in Appalachia, APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/R4NV-
DWZE (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 176  43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o–1 (2012). The Grazing Act purported to limit ranchers’ ability to 
use public lands, but involved “wildly inflated estimates of available forage,” meaning that 
forage allocations to established domestic livestock producers were nominal only. Fairfax, 
supra note 128, at 969; accord George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The 
Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act (pt. 2), 13 ENVTL. L. 
1, 27 (1982). 
 177  Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991, 
1021, 1025 (2014); Hoffmann, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
 178  Huber, supra note 177, at 1031–32. 
 179  Id. at 1031 & n.218; see also Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 176, at 23–24 
(“Even the popular romanticization of western history does not ignore the homesteader 
harassment, range wars, illegal claims and conspiracies, and other grubby commonplaces of 
those lawless days. . . . [E]stablished ranchers used a variety of devices to monopolize use of the 
public lands when they could not settle, buy, or steal them outright. . . . All the while, Congress 
stood aloof from the fray. . . . The Department of the Interior, on the occasions when it was so 
inclined, was largely powerless to prevent the obvious damage to [public resources] and the 
deterioration of public morality. Frontier life encouraged disregard for sophisticated legal rules 
and discouraged behavior thought ‘civilized’ in the East. The rancher prized individualism and 
lived by rudimentary notions of self-interest. Those frontier attitudes have been altered, but not 
eradicated, by the course of history.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 180  See Huber, supra note 177, at 1032–35 (explaining the durability of private land claims on 
public land and the challenges of administering those claims); Miller, supra note 153 (“[T]he 
remoteness of sagebrush country feels like it is a world apart; it is, but when it’s federal land, 
the rules of law apply in ways that are not common for a place where things are still done with a 
handshake. . . . [F]ederal law is something altogether different. It doesn’t bend like the state and 
local officials; it comes at you the same no matter where. That is what is hard for people born to 
this place to get. . . . [T]he feds . . . don’t play by house rules, and what appears like the general 
application of the rule of law to anyone who doesn’t live here feels like bald tyranny to those 
used to being able to intimidate their way out of enforcement by state or local officials.”). 
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The northern and central regions of Appalachia similarly have a history 
of ineffective government oversight. Many commentators have recognized 
the coal industry, rather than the government, as the most powerful regional 
entity. McGinley characterizes the early 20th century social order in 
Appalachia as completely dominated by coal companies.181 Then, as recently 
as the early 21st century, “running a political campaign against the coal 
industry in the Appalachian region [was] an election failure guarantee,” in 
part because of the millions of dollars the industry spent on gubernatorial, 
legislative, and judicial campaigns.182 Federal legislation seeking to regulate 
Appalachian society has also had little influence.183 The Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977184 (SMCRA), for instance, required that 
mining operators restore surface land to its original contour,185 but 
Appalachian plaintiffs have largely been unable to recover remedies for 
widespread subsidence problems because of state courts’ favorable 
treatment of coal operators.186 The long acceptance of devastating 
mountaintop removal and stream-filling practices under the Clean Water Act 
also illustrates how residents have largely been left to fend for themselves.187 
The other side of the coin of federal absenteeism is the regions’ 
respective reputations as lawless societies. Western states saw “range wars” 
fought in the 19th century over grazing rights.188 Appalachia had its own 
“mine wars” and is known for famous family feuds.189 Both regions are 
	
 181  Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop Removal: Environmental 
Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21, 26 n.11 (2004). 
 182  Mark Baller & Leor Joseph Pantilat, Comment, Defenders of Appalachia: The Campaign 
to Eliminate Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining and the Role of Public Justice, 37 ENVTL. L. 629, 
649, 656 (2007) 
 183  Cf. Gail McGowan Mellor, The Hanged Census Worker: Why Appalachia Hates Feds, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009), https://perma.cc/E2BE-234J (“The U.S. government began its 
life back in 1791 by shafting the Appalachian area. People have not forgotten it, perhaps 
because it has yet to stop happening.”). 
 184  Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2012). 
 185  Id. at § 1266(b)(1). 
 186  Wendy B. Davis, Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown of King Coal, 51 AM. U. L. 
REV. 905, 936 (2002); Ken Ward Jr., 30 Years Later, Mine Law’s Success Debated, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE-MAIL (July 22, 2007), https://perma.cc/2B9N-GP2F (“[M]ajor questions remain about 
[SMCRA’s] effectiveness. Across the Appalachian coalfields, citizens still complain about strip 
mining. They say blasting rattles their homes and cracks foundations, mud and chemicals are 
dumped into streams, scalped forests and hills contribute to flooding and valley-fill waste piles 
bury hundreds of miles of streams. Even some longtime coal industry supporters and regulators 
are starting to wonder if the law . . . has not lived up to its promise.”). 
 187  See generally David C. Holzman, Mountaintop Removal Mining: Digging into Community 
Health Concerns, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A476, A482–83 (2011) (discussing the human health 
and ecological consequences of mountaintop removal mining). In recent news, Congress voted, 
largely along party lines, to rescind the Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 
2016), promulgated by the Obama Administration. Hiroko Tabuchi, G.O.P. Reverses Obama-Era 
Rule to Protect Streams from Coal Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2017, at A17. 
 188  Hillary M. Hoffmann, A Changing of the Cattle Guard: The Bureau of Land Management’s 
New Approach to Grazing Qualifications, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 243, 249 (2009). 
 189  Davis, supra note 186, at 908 (discussing the Hatfield–McCoy feud); Jessica Lilly & Roxy 
Todd, Suppressed Mine Wars History Being Revived Inside Appalachia, W. VA. PUB. 
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known for disengagement with government, vigilantism, feuds, and a 
preference for informal dispute resolution.190 While these characterizations 
tend to play on unfair stereotypes, they also may indicate the presence of 
cultures where the rule of law has a looser hold than in more urban, 
population-dense areas.191 
The federal absenteeism and lawlessness parallels are of course linked 
to the rural nature of life in both regions—another commonality between the 
movements. Scholars writing about rural law, development, and sociology 
have consistently noted the lack of attention rural issues receive in 
scholarship and policymaking.192 A “live-and-let-live” philosophy, attachment 
to private property rights, and skepticism of government are all cultural 
tendencies associated with rural areas.193 Significantly, the face of each 
social movement discussed here is a working resident of a rural area—the 
beleaguered rancher for the Land Transfer Movement and the beleaguered 
coal miner for the War on Coal campaign. 
A slightly subtler commonality between the two regions is that 
residents of each have relatively limited opportunities to participate in 
autonomous land use decision making. Seventy percent of the land in the 
Great Basin is publically owned.194 Although federal agencies are shifting 
toward participatory decision-making models, the postpreservation-era 
model, when enforced, has been top-down and technocratic.195 Westerners 
	
BROADCASTING (Feb. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/LXP2-WGNQ (discussing the conflicts between 
workers, labor unions, and mine company guards). 
 190  Charles Conrad & Lucinda Sinclair-James, Institutional Pressures, Cultural Constraints, 
and Communication in Community Mediation Organizations, in CONFLICT AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
COMMUNICATIVE PROCESSES 69, 78–80, 85 (Anne Maydan Nicotera ed., 1995) (Appalachia); 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1–2, 4–5, 282 
(1991) (western United States). 
 191  Pruitt, Space Tames, supra note 79, at 207. 
 192  E.g., Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 969, 975 (2005). 
 193  ELLICKSON, supra note 190, at 53–54, 250–52; Ann Eisenberg, Addressing Rural Blight: 
Lessons from West Virginia and WV LEAP, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 513, 523–24 (2016); Pruitt 
& Sobczynski, supra note 3, at 331–32. 
 194  Alicia Torregrosa & Nora Devoe, Urbanization and Changing Land Use in the Great 
Basin, in COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH IN THE GREAT BASIN—EXAMINING THE 
ISSUES AND DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 9 10 (Jeanne C. Chambers et al. eds., 2008), 
https://perma.cc/AU6P-PA6R. 
 195  See Kirsten M. Leong et al., The New Governance Era: Implications for Collaborative 
Conservation and Adaptive Management in Department of the Interior Agencies, 16 HUM. 
DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 236, 237–39 (2011) (arguing that the Department of the Interior has 
adopted a public engagement model of decision-making sporadically and informally); id. at 237 
(“Previous eras relied on scientific management principles and technocratic decision-making, 
which emphasize fixed goals, stable systems, reductionism, certainties, prediction and control, 
competition among interests, and expert authority governance.”); see also Allyson Barker et al., 
The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal Land and Resource Management: A Legal Analysis, 
23 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 67 (2003) (assessing whether existing legal framework 
controlling public lands accommodates role for collaborative groups); Bryan, supra note 9, at 
149 (arguing that federal agency land use planning “is so highly discretionary that it has become 
inexcusably inconsistent from one agency to the next, and experienced as arbitrary by the 
communities involved”). 
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who do not favor federal land ownership could be said to suffer a sort of 
reverse environmental justice issue, bearing a disproportionate burden of 
conservation interests compared to other Americans without opportunities 
for meaningful participation. In Appalachia, the opposite influences have led 
to a similar result: aggressive land acquisition by private interests for several 
centuries has resulted in dramatically high rates of land ownership by out-of-
state, corporate entities, stymieing local decision-making power.196 If one is 
looking for someone to blame for poverty, or anything else in the Great 
Basin, the federal government as landlord is an easy target.197 If one is 
looking for someone to blame in Appalachia, federal indifference to the 
region’s plight could easily be blamed, as with SMCRA. In either case, the 
end result is a sense of powerlessness and anger.198 
The crux of these commonalities is that the two social movements 
would have logical appeal to some working residents of these regions and 
comparable ones. The rule of law in their respective regions has always been 
tenuous, yet they lack a voice in land use decision making—decision making 
that typically plays a role not just in determining natural resource uses, but 
also in communities’ cultural and economic development. Meanwhile, after 
several decades of devastating economic trends and population loss, rural 
life is harsh and opportunities are limited.199 Hostility toward environmental 
regulation and bristling at exercises of federal authority, which may have the 
effect of changing traditional economic pursuits focused on natural 
resources, becomes unsurprising. Indeed, sociologists credit the past several 
decades of poverty and economic crises with the rise of antigovernment 
militias in the 1990s.200 In places that it has done little to regulate historically, 
federal policy may seek to limit decision-making power even further, while 
reducing or repositioning the few economic opportunities that were 
traditionally available.201 Adding the influence of politicians, industry players, 
and questionable media sources to the mix, it is no wonder that an EPA or 
BLM agenda is lost on a substantial faction of this demographic, and that 
anti-environmental, anti-federal alienation continues to germinate.202 
	
 196  Ann M. Eisenberg, Land Shark at the Door? Why and How States Should Regulate 
Landmen, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 177–78 (2016). 
 197  See Miller, supra note 153 (“In the weird world of renewable, non-compete grazing 
permits, there are families that have grazed federal land for generations but do not own it. 
There is an odd tenant-farmer reality: some of these families have been here for generations but 
do not own any land. This creates immense hostility, especially when new conditions are placed 
on those permits.”). 
 198  See generally JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN 
AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980). 
 199  See Miller, supra note 153 (“[I]t is hard to underestimate the effects of globalization on 
these remote farms.”); Kimmel & Ferber, supra note 130, at 584 (discussing the economic 
restructuring of rural America). 
 200  See, e.g., Dyer, supra note 4 (discussing how poverty, economic problems, and racism 
lead to belief in conspiracy thinking). 
 201  Miller, supra note 153. 
 202  Alienation is used here for its meaning in common usage: the feeling of absence of 
connectedness. However, there is perhaps a connection to be made with Marx’s theory of 
alienation. See KARL MARX, Alienated Labor, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 85 (David 
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This alienation could be seen as a natural outgrowth of rural life. Pruitt 
has argued that “formal law and rural spatiality are fundamentally at odds 
with each other because the presence of law as a force of the state—as an 
ordering force—is in tension with the material character of rurality, as well 
as with rurality’s associated sociospatial features.”203 It could alternatively be 
seen as a form of anomie or legal cynicism, the complex evolution of a social 
group’s perception that the law is illegitimate, possibly stemming from 
“procedural injustice.”204 However this phenomenon might best be described, 
it should be recognized that these groups see themselves as a part of the 
SESs in which they reside, yet external to the governance regimes that seek 
to influence those systems. That influence, it is presumed here, could 
achieve much-needed, enhanced effectiveness if members of this 
demographic considered themselves internal to both frameworks. 
It has likely not helped this alienation that the environmentalist 
response to concerns about jobs has at times been to vilify or ignore the jobs 
advocates, to treat workers in traditionally polluting industries as morally 
inferior, or to treat employment prospects as an economic issue that is not 
environmentalism’s job to solve.205 This response is not necessarily 
unsympathetic. The jobs advocates are often industry players who use the 
image of the workers’ need as a means to pursue their own interests. 
	
McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000) (1844) (discussing how political economy leads to 
workers becoming more valueless the more they produce). 
 203  Pruitt, Space Tames, supra note 79, at 190. These features, she explains, include “low 
population density, small population clusters, and a dominance of what is perceived as nature 
over the built environment.” Id. 
 204  See, e.g., David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the 
Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1190 (2011); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 
The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011). These 
concepts, denoting perceptions of law as illegitimate, are discussed more frequently with regard 
to disconnects between minority communities and the police or courts. A comparison of that 
area of scholarship and this discussion reveals interesting parallels. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL 
HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT 
(2016); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform & the Dismantling of Legal Cynicism, 126 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
 205  See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 114, at 115–16 (“In his March 25, 1999 testimony to the 
U.S. Senate regarding the potential impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, the president of the United 
Mine Workers of America estimated that enacting the greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
envisioned by the protocol would result in a loss of over 1 million American jobs. 
Environmentalists of course dispute[d] these job loss claims as unfounded or at least extremely 
exaggerated.” (footnotes omitted)). I am perhaps guilty of this myself. In an article on shale gas 
development, I argued that economic need should not be taken into account for communities 
deciding whether to allow shale gas development. Ann M. Eisenberg, Beyond Science and 
Hysteria: Reality and Perceptions of Environmental Justice Concerns Surrounding Marcellus 
and Utica Shale Gas Development, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 183 (2015). Meanwhile, some residents of 
southern New York were threatening to secede because of their desire to take advantage of 
fracking’s economic benefits. Susanne Craig, Former Hub of Manufacturing Ponders Next Act, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2015, at A20. Of course, this is not an argument that economic opportunity 
should trump public health and safety consideration. But as Ruhl has noted, confrontational 
attitudes and insistence upon preservation has not necessarily helped the environmental 
movement. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 433. 
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Furthermore, the jobs need does not reduce the need for and urgency of 
environmental protection. 
Overall, this dialogue is a sensitive one. Environmentalists seeking to 
expand the discourse might fear being seen as sanctioning environmental 
degradation, or as asking: “But what about the white people?” in a time 
where institutional racism is a clear and pressing societal concern. Ammon 
Bundy’s acquittal, for instance, attributed by many to white privilege, stood 
in stark contrast to events that took place simultaneously in North Dakota, 
where police violently suppressed indigenous residents protesting the 
Dakota Access pipeline.206 Even worse, given the association of rural 
antigovernment militias and the Bundys themselves with white supremacist 
views, one might fear being seen as asking, “But what about the white 
supremacists?”207 
This discussion does not seek to absolve people like the Bundys of their 
moral shortcomings, or to advocate strengthening legal or social institutions 
that perpetuate white supremacy. Rather, it seeks, first, to call attention to 
the cultural rifts discussed above, to question the effectiveness of 
environmentalism’s sometimes “us-versus-them” mentality, and to spur 
examination of prejudices still treated as socially acceptable in many 
spheres. One resident of Appalachia observed, “We’re probably one of the 
last few groups that it’s still politically correct to make fun of . . . . It’s still 
OK to tell, you know, hillbilly, redneck jokes.”208 This discussion seeks 
further to highlight that suggestions as to environmental regulations’ 
potential to hurt individuals’ employment prospects are not always mere 
propaganda.209 The demise of the coal industry, for instance, is necessary and 
desirable. Yet, the death of coal has also left northern and central 
Appalachia even more socioeconomically devastated than it was before.210 
While environmental advocacy has tended to treat environmental wins as 
nonzero sum scenarios,211 to individuals who bear particular costs, the 
scenarios may in fact be zero sum. Perhaps we can blame the choices of the 
residents and politicians of Appalachia for this devastation, or dismiss it as 
collateral damage for the greater cause. However, we could also look to a 
legal scheme that has treated issues in disciplinary silos and failed to 
account for SES complexity. 
	
 206  E.g., Peniel Joseph, Opinion, The Privileges of Protesting While White, CNN (Oct. 30, 
2016) https://perma.cc/95HW-78UV; Eyder Peralta, Dakota Access Pipeline Protests in North 
Dakota Turn Violent, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: THE TWO-WAY (Sept. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/5B9S-
RDUR. 
 207  Matthew Pulver, This Is What White Supremacy Looks Like: A Party at the Bundy Ranch, 
a Funeral in North Charleston, SALON (Apr. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/L8G9-QLAL. 
 208  Pam Fessler, In Appalachia, Poverty Is in the Eye of the Beholder, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 
18, 2014), https://perma.cc/E6GD-T4NN. 
 209  Miller, supra note 153. 
 210  Economists appear to agree that environmental regulation does not cause a net loss of 
jobs in a society. E.B. GOODSTEIN, JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF A NATIONAL TRADE-
OFF 11 (1994) (“But in this case, there seems to be universal accord that, on an economy-wide 
basis, the ‘jobs versus the environment’ debate is based purely on myth.”). 
 211  Ruhl, Zero Sum, supra note 116; Craig, Zero Sum, supra note 116. 
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D. The Curative Potential of Collaborative Decision Making 
The jobs–environment nexus is precisely the type of issue that we now 
recognize is necessary to accommodate through a holistic legal apparatus 
equipped to interact with SESs of various scales. Resilience, energy, and 
other scholarship has increasingly called for integrative policy approaches 
that reconcile environmental harms, climate, and economic development.212 
The good news is that the types of new governance models being discussed 
in climate scholarship also offer hope for reconciling work and the 
environment, and for mitigating the alienation and cultural divides that 
catalyze the movements discussed above. 
Commentators have specifically pointed to collaborative decision 
making as a potential pathway to mending the work–environment rift. 
Discussing the instances where collaborative decision-making has proven 
effective, Obach argues, “actual individuals have to interact in a concerted 
manner to establish relations with one another.”213 For instance, he describes 
how collaborative decision making and the opportunity to interface brought 
a harmonious ending to a bitter conflict between tannery workers and 
environmentalists in Gloversville, New York. Two representatives of the 
respective groups 
were asked to simply talk about the issues that they confronted in 
Gloversville. . . . This interaction caused both of them to begin to rethink their 
relationship. The conference workshop was the first civil interaction between 
these two movements leaders, and the simple sharing of concerns in this forum 
allowed for greater understanding of one another’s position in the dispute. . . . 
These interactions allowed for crucial trust building between the two activists 
as well as a greater appreciation for one another’s views on the issues that 
divided them.214 
From a policy standpoint, he points to the importance of creating 
“brokerages”—people and entities that can facilitate these dialogues.215 
Obach and Barca argue that labor–environmentalist cooperation has 
proven quite influential when it occurs. Obach observes, “[w]hen unions and 
environmentalists have positive relations with one another and form an 
ongoing alliance, they present a formidable political force potentially 
capable of redirecting economic and environmental policy in fundamental 
ways.”216 Barca argues that corporate and political actors strive to widen rifts 
between labor and environmental groups because if they do not, “the 
awareness of the organic connections existing between labor, environment 
and health is capable of producing a radical critique of the economic system 
and a new emancipatory discourse, which is potentially very dangerous for 
	
 212  E.g., Flatt & Payne, supra note 34. 
 213  OBACH, supra note 81, at 19 (emphasis omitted). 
 214  Id. at 4–5. 
 215  Id. at 207. 
 216  Id. at 14. 
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the political-economic order.”217 Obach notes, “[a] deeper understanding of 
this type of cooperation is important because a single organization is rarely 
capable of advancing any significant political goal by itself. . . . [T]he ability 
to enlist a range of allies in political struggles is often a crucial determinant 
of success.”218 
The collaborative decision-making component of adaptive governance 
thus holds significance in its potential to address the work–environment rift. 
The subsequent discussion of case studies addresses in more detail how 
adaptive governance also cuts to the other cultural issues discussed above 
by reducing the rigidity of legal schemes; facilitating information exchange, 
bottom-up governance, and trust-building; validating diverse experiences; 
and personalizing the federal government. The next section revisits Malheur 
and argues that Malheur’s 2013 management plan was not just an example of 
successful multistakeholder planning. It also offers an important example of 
bridging the rift between work and environment, through processes that 
look a lot like adaptive governance, to the benefit of federal climate policy. 
IV. THE MALHEUR REFUGE: A CLIMATE-ERA PLANNING PROCESS? 
For those who had not heard of the Malheur Refuge prior to Bundy’s 
occupation, the impression might have been that Malheur is an area rife with 
conflict or the site of a modern-day ranch war. As an initial matter, however, 
one would be hard-pressed to consider Bundy and the other occupiers to be 
“stakeholders” in the Malheur SES—that is, individuals who would be 
entitled to some form of input in the Refuge’s management.219 Only three of 
the twenty-five occupiers were residents of Oregon.220 No evidence suggests 
that they had attempted to communicate with those connected to Malheur 
prior to the occupation. Malheur appears to have been a strategic political 
choice for the protest.221 
In fact, the Malheur landscape does have a history of conflict among 
other ranchers, birders and other conservationists, Native tribes, and various 
government agencies.222 Nevertheless, in recent history, Malheur has been 
lauded for its efforts to funnel this conflict into a multistakeholder, 
collaborative planning process pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge 
	
 217  Barca, supra note 96, at 67. 
 218  OBACH, supra note 81, at 7. 
 219  See generally Mark S. Reed et al., Who’s in and Why? A Typology of Stakeholder Analysis 
Methods for Natural Resource Management, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1933 (2009). 
 220  Faces of the Malheur Occupation, supra note 1. 
 221  See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 125, at 53–54 (noting that most of the occupiers did not 
come from Oregon, yet “seized the opportunity presented by the sentencing of two local 
ranchers to obtain publicity for their cause”). 
 222  See generally NANCY LANGSTON, WHERE LAND AND WATER MEET: A WESTERN LANDSCAPE 
TRANSFORMED 12–62 (2003) (describing tensions going back as early as the 1870s, including the 
attempt to drive the Paiute Tribe from the Malheur Lake basin, so that Euro-Americans could 
claim it for their own). 
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System Improvement Act of 1997,223 which directed all refuges to adopt and 
implement comprehensive conservation plans setting forth management 
guidance for the next fifteen years.224 One commentator described the 
process as “community-led conservation.”225 Many agree that it was 
innovative.226 This section notes a few characteristics of the planning process 
and substantive elements that reflect the type of governance some call for to 
accommodate SESs. 
A. Background and the Collaborative Planning Process 
The remote Refuge, created under President Teddy Roosevelt in 1908,227 
comprises approximately 187,000 acres, or around 290 square miles, within 
the lake system of the northwestern Great Basin.228 Its wildlife includes a 
famously rich array of bird populations, with more than 320 species of birds 
and 58 mammal species observed there.229 Prior to its use as a refuge, the 
	
 223  Emma Marris, How Malheur Became the Epicenter of Community-Led Conservation, 
AUDUBON (Summer 2016), https://perma.cc/FAA5-ECWR (“The Malheur occupation depicted a 
landscape locked in conflict—but it was far from the truth.”). 
 224  National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, § 7(a)(2), 
111 Stat. 1252, 1258 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1) (2012)). Other laws 
influence the Comprehensive Conservation Planning process, including the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012); the Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012); the National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. 
§§ 300301–307108 (Supp. II 2015); the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2012); 
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4157 (2012). In addition to statutes, several 
executive orders influence the process. Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect 
Migratory Birds, Exec. Order No. 13,186, 3 C.F.R. at 719 (2002); Consultation and Coordination 
with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. at 304 (2001); Federal Actions 
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, Exec. 
Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. at 859 (1995); Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs, Exec. 
Order No. 12,372, 3 C.F.R. at 197 (1983); Protection of Wetlands, Exec. Order No. 11,990, 3 
C.F.R. 1977 at 121 (1978); Floodplain Management, Exec. Order No. 11,988, 3 C.F.R. at 117 
(1978). 
 225  Marris, supra note 223. 
 226  E.g., Nancy Langston, Opinion, The Surprising History of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge, 
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/CSK6-MRLN. 
 227  The Refuge was created by an Executive Order entered on August 18, 1908, by President 
Theodore Roosevelt. Exec. Order No. 929 (1908), microformed on Presidential Executive 
Orders & Proclamations (1789-1983) (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“It is hereby ordered that all smallest 
legal subdivisions which touch the shore line of Lakes Malheur and Harney and the streams and 
waters connecting these lakes . . . are hereby reserved, subject to valid existing rights, and set 
aside for the use of the Department of Agriculture as a preserve and breeding ground for native 
birds. The taking or destruction of birds’ eggs and nests, and the taking or killing of any species 
of native bird for any purpose whatsoever . . . is prohibited and warning is expressly given to all 
persons not to commit within the reserved territory any of the acts hereby enjoined. This 
reserve to be known as Lake Malheur Reservation.”). The Refuge’s name was subsequently 
changed twice, culminating with Malheur National Wildlife Refuge per Presidential 
Proclamation No. 2416 issued on July 25, 1940. Proclamation No. 2416, 3 C.F.R. at. 49, 54 (1940). 
 228  Dave Seminara, Angry Birders: Standoff at Oregon Refuge Has Riled a Passionate Group, 
N.Y. TIMES: IN TRANSIT (Jan. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/F484-4MRY. 
 229  Id. 
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area was an essential source of water for the Paiute Indians, who were 
pushed out by cattle ranchers.230 
From the 1930s to the early 1970s, “refuge staff was beset by continual 
complications and battles with ranchers, farmers, and finally 
conservationists” over scarce resources at Malheur.231 “In the 1970s, when 
concern about overgrazing reduced—but did not eliminate—refuge grazing, 
violence erupted again. Some environmentalists denounced ranchers as 
parasites who destroyed wildlife habitat. A few ranchers responded with 
death threats against environmentalists and federal employees.”232 But the 
1990s saw momentum gaining for local interest in collaborative decision 
making.233 
The planning process for the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge 
Comprehensive Conservation Plan (Conservation Plan) began in earnest in 
2008 under Refuge Manager Tim Bodeen.234 The National Wildlife Refuge 
System Administration Act of 1966235, the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Improvement Act of 1997, and subsequent policy documents offered some 
guidance as to how to proceed.236 However, in light of refuges’ highly varied 
histories, authorities, and needs, planning processes were mostly left to local 
discretion.237 After Bodeen announced his interest in pursuing an approach 
involving more public participation than was traditional, some were 
skeptical; according to one observer, “early on it looked like the process at 
Malheur might implode due to all the mistrust.”238 Planners agreed to focus 
	
 230  LANGSTON, supra note 222, at 27–28; Kelly House, Burns Paiutes to Ammon Bundy: You’re 
Not the Victim, OREGONIAN (Feb. 7, 2016) https://perma.cc/5C9J-GJFC. 
 231  Richard J. Finkmoore, Recent Books on the National Wildlife Refuge System and Its 
Uncertain Future, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1239, 1242 (2004) (reviewing LANGSTON, supra note 
222); accord DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT THE PUBLIC TROUGH (1983). 
 232  Langston, supra note 226. 
 233  Id. (“Paiute tribal members, ranchers, environmentalists and federal agencies 
collaborated on innovative grazing plans to restore bird habitat while also giving ranchers more 
flexibility.”). 
 234  Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, Harney County, OR, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,046 (June 29, 
2009); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE 
MALHEUR NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT 1 (2013) [hereinafter MALHEUR ROD], https://perma.cc/5MQU-MZJX. 
 235  16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2012). 
 236  MALHEUR NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MALHEUR NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE REFUGE: COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION PLAN 1-4 to -13 (2013) [hereinafter 
CONSERVATION PLAN]. 
 237  Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern 
Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 592–612 (2002) [hereinafter Fischman, National 
Wildlife Refuge] (“[Surveying] the hodgepodge of instruments, authorities, and purposes to 
illustrate the centrifugal forces that resist cohesive, systemic management.”); Robert L. 
Fischman, From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the 2006 National Wildlife 
Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 92–94 (2007) [hereinafter 
Fischman, From Words to Action] (“[T]he [2006 Goals and Refuge Purposes] Policy reflects a 
surrender to the centrifugal forces of local, particularized priorities and a relegation to 
secondary status of the organic mission to connect the refuges into a system that is more than 
the sum of its parts.”). 
 238  Bernton, supra note 1. 
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on three tenets: commitment, honesty, and communication.239 The 
Conservation Plan describes its process as “a three-year collaborative effort 
by dozens of stakeholders working closely with each other and with Refuge 
staff and experts.”240 It contextualizes the process further: 
The Refuge is a cherished place, widely embraced by all kinds of people for 
its ability to provide for wildlife, recreation, and support of local communities. 
However, it has also been a flashpoint for conflict and controversy over the 
past few decades. This controversy has created deep divisions and distrust 
between the Refuge and stakeholders as well as between the stakeholders 
themselves. In the meantime, the ecological health of the Refuge’s waterways 
and wetlands—long recognized as some of North America’s most important 
habitat for migratory birds—was in steep decline as common carp came to 
dominate most wet areas while other invasive non-native species spread 
throughout the Refuge.241 
Years 2009, 2010, and 2011 involved dozens of meetings with 
congressional representatives, tribes, county commissioners, community 
and business organizations, federal and state agencies, academics, a 
specialized ecology work group, and individuals—including ranchers, other 
local residents, neighboring landowners, past Refuge employees, activists, 
and other concerned citizens.242 In addition to six open houses, planners had 
listening posts at local events and several workshops with local participants 
focused on specific issues, such as priority resources of concern and the 
invasive carp problem.243 Planners regularly mailed out planning updates to 
organizations, officials, and local residents, provided notice of events in 
local press and on the Refuge’s website, and published notices in the Federal 
Register, once in 2009 and twice in 2012.244 
Despite initial public skepticism, “with the help of a facilitator, people 
kept coming to the meetings.”245 Leaders took measures to recognize 
tensions while still streamlining communication. Meeting attendees 
had green cards that they could hold up when they agreed with a plan 
objective, yellow that they could show to indicate concerns, and red that stood 
	
 239  MALHEUR ROD, supra note 234, at 1. 
 240  Colby Marshal et al., Forward to CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 236, at i, i. 
 241  Id. 
 242  CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 236, app. J at J1–J6 (listing six meetings with 
congressional representatives and/or their aides, four meetings with tribes, eleven meetings 
with elected officials, thirty-two meetings with community/business organizations, eleven 
meetings with collaborators, forty meetings with agencies and academia, and twenty-five 
meetings with individuals). 
 243  Id. app. J at J1, J4–J6. 
 244  Id. app. J at J1, J6–J7; Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, Harney County, OR; Final 
Comprehensive Conservation Plan and Final Environmental Impact Statement, 77 Fed. Reg. 
75,644 (Dec. 21, 2012); Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, Harney County, OR; Draft 
Comprehensive Conservation Plan and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 77 Fed. Reg. 
13,139 (Mar. 5, 2012); Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, Harney County, OR, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,046 
(June 29, 2009). 
 245  Bernton, supra note 1. 
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for flat out opposition. When someone held up a red card, the group would go 
back and work on the objective some more.246 
The Conservation Plan concluded: 
This non-traditional and collaborative planning process has helped rebuild 
the relationships and communication necessary to produce a remarkable 
consensus around the core principles embedded in the Refuge’s 15-year CCP: 
 Ongoing collaborative approach to implementation, built around 
partnerships and a shared commitment to the long-term sustainability 
of the Refuge and the larger Harney Basin’s wildlife, habitats, and 
human communities; 
 Commitment to science-based, active adaptive management, driven 
by monitoring and evaluation of results, with Refuge decision making 
that is transparent and informed by stakeholder involvement; 
 Focus on aquatic ecosystem health and the subsequent benefits to 
waterways, wetlands, and upland habitats.247 
A central result of this collaborative, participatory process was an effort 
to reconcile cattle grazing with ecosystem protection, and to involve 
ranchers more centrally in landscape management.248 “The plan affirmed that 
cattle, if carefully controlled and monitored, could help achieve refuge 
management goals, such as knocking back invasive plants. It called for 
rigorous and ongoing reviews to find out what strategies work, and what 
don’t, for the federal grazing leases now extended to 13 area ranches.”249 This 
effort seemed to have a positive effect on ranching stakeholders. For 
instance, despite one rancher’s ongoing disagreements with some Refuge 
management decisions, he reported that Refuge leadership “earned his 
respect.”250 The rancher stated, “To me, what is important is that the [R]efuge 
has really listened and taken a more collaborative approach . . . . 
Automatically, that helps build better relations with the community.”251 
The planning process was also credited with helping “lay the 
groundwork for another cooperative program to protect sage grouse that 
	
 246  Id. 
 247  Marshal et al., supra note 240, at i.  
 248  One major point of consensus that emerged from the planning process was that invasive 
carp was a problem for everyone. Stakeholders then collaborated to address the issue with 
creative solutions. For instance, some ranchers have turned the invasive carp into organic 
fertilizer to use on their fields. Virginia Gewin, Turning Point: Carpe Freedom, 532 NATURE 533, 
533 (2016). 
 249  Bernton, supra note 1. 
 250  Id. 
 251  Id. 
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started in Harney County.”252 In 2013, when the sage grouse (Centrocercus 
urophasianus) was a candidate for listing under the ESA, one researcher 
observed that “[r]anchers in southeast Oregon [we]re working with land 
managers and conservation groups to develop immediate plans to protect 
the sage-grouse, improve habitat, and ultimately restore health to the 
sagebrush grasslands for the benefit of both wildlife and ranch life.”253 The 
program recruited ranchers to take manageable steps on their land to 
protect the sage grouse, “such as by removing weeds or uprooting junipers 
that offered perches for predators—moves that can also improve 
pastures.”254 In the hope of warding off a listing of the sage grouse under the 
ESA, “ranchers in Harney County [we]re developing strategies to protect 
habitat on both public and private lands, and in turn, sustain their 
ranches.”255 “‘We started saying what’s good for the bird is good for the herd,’ 
said Tom Sharp, a Harney County rancher who helped launch the 
cooperative effort that grew to encompass 53 ranches and 320,000 acres.”256 
The work drew praise from United States Department of the Interior 
Secretary Sally Jewell, who referred to Harney County’s approach as the 
“Oregon Way” and promoted it as a model.257 The initiative is believed to 
have helped prevent the sage grouse from being listed under the ESA.258 
Sharp commented further: 
Ranchers and environmentalists came to realize that they wanted the same 
thing . . . Juniper and weeds hurt sage-grouse and cattle grazing. By 
approaching the problem as a land management problem, not a species 
problem, we could develop plans that would benefit grazing and sage-grouse. 
And ranchers are land managers, so the approach made sense. Cattle across 
the West stand to benefit from rangeland improvements. What’s good for the 
bird is good for the herd.259 
Sharp and an extension agent both “work[ed] with public land agencies to 
make sure the conservation plans and monitoring methods [we]re consistent 
across a landscape of many ownerships and managements.”260 Sharp 
attributed the success of the initiatives to relationships, trust, and “talking 
and working together.”261 
Commentators observed that the Conservation Plan’s development 
process was unusually extensive in its emphasis on collaboration and 
	
 252  Id.; accord Ann Haas, Farmers and Ranchers in Eastern Oregon sign on as Partners to 
Conserve the Sage-grouse, a Candidate Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://perma.cc/FV2B-UZG4 (last updated June 17, 2014). 
 253  Peg Herring, Good for the Bird, Good for the Herd, OR.’S AGRIC. PROGRESS (Winter 2013), 
https://perma.cc/D2QT-494A. 
 254  Bernton, supra note 1. 
 255  Herring, supra note 253. 
 256  Bernton, supra note 1. 
 257  Id. 
 258  Id. 
 259  Id. 
 260  Id. 
 261  Id. 
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participatory decision making.262 Commentators also agree that this 
approach appeared to lead to strong community backing of the plan.263 
Environmental historian Nancy Langston, one of few social scientists to 
study the Refuge in depth, hailed the Conservation Plan as “a landmark 
collaborative conservation plan for the refuge . . . [that] offers great hope for 
the local economy and for wildlife.”264 One journalist deemed it a “sort of 
symbol . . . that shows how federal agencies can reach out to different 
groups with different agendas—tribes, environmentalists and ranchers—and 
find common ground on how to manage the nation’s public lands.”265 In light 
of Malheur’s accolades, several commentators noted the misaligned 
reasoning of the occupiers’ choice of Malheur for their occupation. Portland 
Audubon Society’s conservation director observed, “[i]t is ironic that they 
picked Malheur . . . In a landscape that is very conflicted, it is a place of 
collaboration.”266 Speaking after the occupation, United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service biologist Linda Sue Beck said, “[t]he militants picked the 
wrong refuge to take over. I think they thought it would be easier to sway 
the locals, but our partnerships are strong.”267 Blumm and Jamin conclude 
that “[t]he Malheur Refuge was an odd place for revolt against public land 
management because the local population generally accepted the refuge 
management plan, evidenced by the fact that there was no appeal after the 
plan’s promulgation.”268 
Langston argues that it is not a coincidence that complexity and conflict 
resulted in successful management in this instance. Rather, she suggests that 
“conflicts among different users of Malheur Lake Basin eventually improved 
refuge management, for those conflicts disrupted the hold of narrow 
orthodoxies on resource management.”269 As she elaborates, 
[C]onflict eventually forced groups in Oregon to embrace a political process in 
which stakeholders coming from different perspectives had to jostle against, 
argue with, and listen to one another in ways that modified their actions and 
beliefs. Because no one can ever have perfect knowledge of how dynamic 
ecological systems work, this process moved the refuge toward much better 
solutions than any one group could have found on its own. . . . Only when 
political conflict in the 1970s forced them to allow other stakeholders to have a 
voice did they begin to question some of their own assumptions that seemed so 
self-evident when they hadn’t been required to answer to anyone else.270 
	
 262  Langston, supra note 226. 
 263  Blumm & Jamin, supra note 125, at 53–54; Herring, supra note 253; Gewin, supra note 
248. 
 264  Langston, supra note 226. 
 265  Bernton, supra note 1. 
 266  Marris, supra note 233. 
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 268  Blumm & Jamin, supra note 125, at 53–54. 
 269  LANGSTON, supra note 222, at 9. 
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Of course, not everyone agrees that the process was successful.271 
Acquiescence to ranching interests, some argue, can also be seen as giving in 
to interest groups and allowing them to pursue activities “well-known to 
cause severe damage to riparian and avian habitats.”272 These commentators 
call for “do[ing] away with the incompatible uses of grazing and haying on 
the Refuge.”273 Indeed, it would be unreasonable to presume that “win-win” 
outcomes are always achievable. Nonetheless, it is worth asking whether 
attitudes such as these have undermined environmental policy in the past.274 
Malheur illustrates the value to consensus and conciliation, even if outcomes 
are imperfect. 
B. Significance to Climate Governance 
It remains to be seen whether the substance of the Malheur 
Conservation Plan will stand the test of time, uncertainty, and system 
shocks. Even so, the process that went into creating the plan exemplified, 
and perhaps improved upon, the tenets scholars have sought to clarify as 
necessary parts of dynamic SES governance. The planning process involved 
what Craig and Ruhl deem the “setup phase” of adaptive management, 
where periodic, intensive public participation can improve stakeholder buy-
in and enhance outcomes.275 
Elements believed to facilitate successful adaptive governance include: 
strong leadership; robust public participation; social structures contributing 
to policy formation; transgovernmental networks; innovative and diverse 
forms of information exchange; lack of insistence on a one-size-fits-all 
approach; and a general embrace of flexibility.276 From the successful 
leadership of Tim Bodeen to the effort to reconcile grazing and habitat 
protection, the Malheur process appears to have synthesized many of these 
elements. Further, although this was the setup phase for a more iterative, 
ongoing management process, the setup process itself seems to have 
positioned Malheur well to have a flexible yet cohesive social apparatus to 
draw upon in reaction to system shocks. The example of the sage grouse 
success story suggests the process’s benefits transcend the creation of the 
Conservation Plan. 
Yet, the significance of this process goes deeper than highlighting 
successful adaptive governance. The process also cuts to the issues at the 
heart of the two social movements discussed above, including the work–
	
 271  E.g., Erik Molvar, Opinion, 4 Lessons from the Bundy’s Oregon Misadventure, HILL (Feb. 
2, 2016), https://perma.cc/D28Q-RCTC; Kristin Ruether, Malheur Was Taken over by Ranchers 
Long Before the Bundys Came Along, WILDLIFE NEWS (Feb. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/CL2F-
9PXU. 
 272  Ruether, supra note 271. 
 273  Id. 
 274  Laura Jean Schneider, Opinion, Ranch Diaries: The Anti-Ranching, Misinformed 
Discourse Around Malheur, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/VNS4-VXVV. 
 275  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 31. 
 276  Humby, supra note 30, at 124–27. 
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environment rift. The four common themes driving the movements were: 1) 
a history of federal absenteeism, 2) rural alienation, 3) lack of a voice in land 
use decision making, and 4) jobs versus environment tensions. 
First, bottom-up processes mitigated all of these issues. Michelle Bryan 
argues, “if meaningful collaboration became the standard practice, some of 
the underlying furor over federal lands management could subside.”277 The 
Malheur example suggests this is true. The collaborative process puts a face 
to the nefarious “federal government” and provides an opportunity for trust 
and mutual respect to be established. It recognized and accounted for rural 
alienation and lack of a voice in land use decision making by providing an 
avenue for local experience to be acknowledged, vocalized, and respected; 
both ranchers quoted above mentioned talking and listening as critical to 
their enthusiasm for local planning initiatives. Finally, through information 
exchange and a more flexible hold on preservationism, the process sought to 
reconcile jobs and the environment. 
From a broader, societal perspective, each instance of a successful plan 
like Malheur’s stands to help mend the rift between workers and 
environmentalists. Each opportunity for collaborative decision making can 
furnish mutual understanding and alliances. Critically, as Obach called for, 
the federal government can act as a much-needed broker between labor and 
environmental interests.278 These connections, in turn, can help fuel 
reconciliation toward a more effective national climate policy. Multiple 
plans following this and similar processes throughout the nation could be 
seen as stitching labor and environment together, one conversation at a 
time, to the benefit of federal climate policy. 
It could be suggested that Malheur’s example is of limited help because 
its enabling legislative framework is unique. The refuge system has an 
unusual, meandering, and piecemeal legal history.279 Each refuge is governed 
like a small fiefdom with a hodgepodge of legal authorities determining its 
management, including individual refuges’ declarations of purpose.280 The 
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 was criticized for 
its lack of detailed guidance.281 Is this scenario generalizable? 
Craig and Ruhl’s Model Adaptive Management Procedure Act (MAMPA) 
has already established a framework for the potential codification of 
comparable public participation processes.282 In the formulation of an 
agency’s “Initial Adaptive Management Plan,” MAMPA provides for 
“opportunities for public comment on [the] proposed plan,” with “reasonable 
efforts to identify and offer reasonable opportunities for involvement to 
representatives of interested members of the public and relevant 
	
 277  Bryan, supra note 9, at 148. 
 278  OBACH, supra note 81, at 207. 
 279  Fischman, National Wildlife Refuge, supra note 237, at 462; see also Fischman, From 
Words to Action, supra note 237, at 82, 118 (explaining how the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Improvement Act of 1997 presents an unusual question of legal status). 
 280  Fischman, From Words to Action, supra note 237, at 89. 
 281  Id. at 87.  
 282  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 14. 
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stakeholder groups . . . . [T]he exact number of participating representatives 
and their final composition shall be left to the agency’s sound discretion.”283 
Of course, agency-level decision making is more far-reaching than refuge-
level decision making. Nevertheless, perhaps the Malheur example suggests 
that these provisions could go a bit further by providing for utilization of 
diverse sources of information and comparable mechanisms to mediate 
stakeholder conflicts. 
Malheur’s significance may also lie in a discipline other than 
administrative law. Malheur was a success in part because it employed many 
of the best practices embraced by land use planners. These practices, in 
turn, are formulated with the precise goal of tailoring localized policy to 
localized circumstances—a necessary factor in complexity-based regulation. 
To recreate these benefits in other circumstances, organic administrative 
acts can provide for robust, recurring public participation that involves 
aggressive, multilateral communication, opportunities for meaningful 
information exchange, and actual willingness to adjust outcomes based on 
public input. 
At the very least, the Conservation Plan is one step ahead of regulations 
such as the CPP—the War on Coal campaign’s main target—because the 
Conservation Plan’s value has not been undermined by a conflict over 
whether it should be in place at all.284 EPA climate mitigation initiatives may 
not be the first place we would look to try to implement a model like 
Malheur’s. A refuge is conducive to landscape-level collaboration and 
decision making, and such an approach could be prohibitively expensive on 
a national scale. Yet, there is potential for adaptive governance or similar 
principles to enhance EPA mitigation initiatives. The next section considers 
these issues. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING AND THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROCESS 
UNDERMINING SUBSTANCE? 
The rulemaking process that went into development of the CPP 
followed the normal formula. First, in June 2014, EPA issued a notice 
proposing a rulemaking to establish “emission guidelines for states to follow 
in developing plans to address greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil 
fuel-fired electric generating units.”285 The proposal cited the authority of 
Clean Air Act section 111(d),286 which requires EPA’s Administrator to 
prescribe regulations to establish procedures under which states must 
create plans to establish standards for certain air pollutants.287 Within two 
	
 283  Id. at 68. 
 284  A search of relevant databases reveals the absence of any litigation concerning the 
Conservation Plan as of this writing. 
 285  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 286  Id. at 34,832.  
 287  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
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months, twelve states and industry representatives filed suit in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to block the 
draft rule; the court rejected those challenges as premature in June 2015.288 
Stakeholders provided more than 4.3 million comments on the 
proposed rule, the final version of which EPA announced in August 2015.289 
Under the final rule, EPA 
establish[ed] for the first time [greenhouse gas] emission guidelines for 
existing power plants. These final emission guidelines, which rely in large part 
on already clearly emerging growth in clean energy innovation, development 
and deployment, will lead to significant carbon dioxide (CO2) emission 
reductions from the utility power sector that will help protect human health 
and the environment from the impacts of climate change.290 
In February 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the plan pending a resolution of 
the renewed case before the D.C. Circuit.291 
That political and corporate interests would react as they always have 
to environmental reform efforts is no surprise. Nevertheless, it is worth 
asking whether more could have been done to garner popular support for 
this climate mitigation initiative.292 Critically, a public opinion poll conducted 
in 2016 found that 69% of voters had heard “just a little or nothing at all” 
about EPA’s CPP.293 For those who were familiar with the CPP, 89% of 
Democrats favored it, but less than half of Republicans did.294 Only 44% of 
Republicans, compared to 91% of Democrats and 68% of independents, 
believed that reducing greenhouse gases from energy production should be a 
high priority.295 Sixty-eight percent of Republicans found persuasive the 
argument that reducing greenhouse gases would cause job losses, and 
therefore should be set at a low priority, compared to 31% of Democrats and 
51% of independents who found the argument unconvincing.296 In fact, the 
poll report concluded that “much of the opposition to the CPP appears 
related to concerns about workers who would lose jobs in the course of an 
energy transition, particularly those in the coal industry.”297 The poll’s results 
suggest that lack of public knowledge accounted in large part for the lack of 
popular support for the CPP. For those who were familiar with the CPP, 
perceptions related to the work–environment rift undermined support as 
well. 
	
 288  Murray Energy Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 788 F.3d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 289  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,704 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  
 290  Id. at 64,663. 
 291  Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016). 
 292  This inquiry sets aside for now any actual legal interpretation of the CPP’s legitimacy 
under the Clean Air Act and the Constitution. 
 293  STEVEN KULL ET AL., PROGRAM FOR PUB. CONSULTATION, CONSIDERING THE COST OF CLEAN: 
AMERICANS ON ENERGY, AIR QUALITY AND CLIMATE 15 (2016), https://perma.cc/79ZF-GUKB. 
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 295  Id. at 8. 
 296  Id. at 7. 
 297  Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
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The Obama Administration’s earlier successful creation of the “tailpipe 
rule” limiting greenhouse gas emissions for vehicles298 stands in contrast to 
the CPP and also suggests the work–environment rift played a role in 
opposition to the CPP. While the tailpipe rule faced backlash, it did not 
inspire a visceral, widespread, populist movement against it like the CPP 
did.299 The tailpipe rule’s more minimal impact on jobs and production could 
explain the absence of backlash to the rule, whereas the CPP’s wider reach 
likely inspired more aggressive political pushback. 
Given the lack of public familiarity with the CPP and the potential for 
adaptive governance and other forms of collaborative decision making to 
bridge the work–environment rift, perhaps the lack of enthusiasm for the 
CPP is as much an issue of process as it is an issue of ideology. Compare the 
experience of the rancher participating in the Malheur conservation planning 
process (which is, by its nature, a federal climate adaptation initiative) to the 
experience of a coal miner in West Virginia participating in the creation of 
the CPP (the flagship federal climate mitigation initiative)—both of whom, 
the data suggest, are more likely to identify as Republican.300 With the 
former, the rancher talks to his neighbors, hears new information, 
contributes information, and enjoys some level of transparency in decision-
making processes. With the latter, the miner seems unlikely to be aware of a 
notice-and-comment period for a new rule, let alone to participate in the 
comment process. More likely, he might hear about the rule in highly 
politicized contexts.301 For the miner, the climate mitigation initiative lacked 
interaction, information exchange, and transparency. Yet the CPP affects 
him, just as the Malheur plan would affect stakeholder ranchers.302 Is it a 
surprise that the miner would be more likely to hold anti-CPP sympathies? 
It is not unheard of to discuss adaptive management in the context of 
EPA and air pollution control, although scholars acknowledge that “EPA’s 
history and structure make it a challenging locale in which to attempt” it.303 
From 1995 to 2002, EPA experimented with a novel form of regulatory 
intervention that it called Project XL, standing for “Excellence in 
Leadership.”304 The program offered “regulatory flexibility in exchange for 
commitments to achieve better environmental results—results superior to 
those that would otherwise have been attained through full compliance with 
	
 298  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 299  See, e.g., John M. Broder, Limits Set on Pollution from Auto, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at 
B1 (noting that the rule represented a “truce” between car manufacturers and regulators). 
 300  See Asma Khalid, Republicans’ White Working-Class Trap: A Growing Reliance, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/GQN5-6QRP. 
 301  See, e.g., Phil Kerpen, Opinion, Obama Declares a War on Coal, FOX NEWS (June 25, 
2013), https://perma.cc/PAV7-9ZTF (framing President Obama’s Climate Action Plan as a “War 
on Coal”). 
 302  See Steve Inskeep, In Kentucky, the Coal Habit Is Hard to Break, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 
12, 2016), https://perma.cc/P5QP-TATH (interviewing a miner who voted for President Obama in 
the first election but not the second, in part because of coal regulation). 
 303  Susskind & Secunda, supra note 42, at 155–56. 
 304  Id. at 155; Project XL, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/FK2N-MAB4 
(last visited, Feb. 25, 2017). 
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regulations.”305 Implementers envisioned XL projects as “‘real world’ tests of 
innovative strategies to achieve cleaner and less expensive results than 
conventional regulatory techniques.”306 Through these “experiments,” Project 
XL sought to both implement and evaluate adaptive management 
strategies.307 
Project XL encountered a variety of problems, however. Striving for 
“cooperation among the regulated community, non-governmental 
environmental groups (NGOs), the public, and [EPA’s] own philosophically 
divided staff” proved tense.308 Disagreements also arose over to how to 
exercise agency discretion.309 
Lawrence Susskind and Joshua Secunda nonetheless concluded that 
Project XL did achieve some significant results, and their 1999 article, 
Improving Project XL, offered simple and achievable suggestions for 
improvement. They argued in favor of: internal agreement on the Project’s 
goals; internal discussion of philosophical disagreements; a facilitated, 
agency-wide dialogue; and the use of “a collaborative, problem-solving 
process aimed at defining the goals of Project XL” in conjunction with 
stakeholders.310 Susskind and Secunda acknowledged that achieving these 
measures would be difficult, but argued further that “a crosscutting Office of 
Reinvention” and a specialized advisory committee could facilitate these 
processes.311 They also advocated consensus-building, through which they 
believed “conflicting interests and goals can be charted and reconciled, 
institutional and policy barriers identified and surmounted, and a mutually 
acceptable agenda agreed upon.”312 They concluded that despite Project XL’s 
weaknesses, 
[It] still ha[d] the potential to move all stakeholders (including EPA) towards 
the institutionalization of collaborative process for formulating improved 
environmental compliance goals. The steps required to do so can be achieved 
within the confines of the existing XL initiative. They include: a focus on 
problem solving as opposed to win-lose negotiation; information sharing and 
open deliberation among all stakeholders; meaningful participation by all 
interested and affected parties at all stages of the process; and a new 
perception of rulemaking as the ongoing formulation of provisional solutions 
to emerging problems.313 
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Critics pointed to Project XL’s high costs and management mistakes.314 
Nevertheless, one has to wonder what the state of the CPP would have been 
if Susskind and Secunda’s vision had been used to create it—a vision that 
sounds more like the Malheur planning process and adaptive governance 
than like administrative rulemaking. 
The CPP’s content does reveal some consideration of jobs and 
economic transitions in hard-hit communities. Drafters included the 
Partnerships for Economic Opportunity and Workforce and Economic 
Revitalization (POWER) Plus Plan directing billions of dollars to coal 
communities as an integral part of the CPP.315 The rule directs states, in 
crafting plans to comply with the CPP under its cooperative federalism 
model, to contemplate and prioritize employment opportunities.316 The Sierra 
Club lauded the Administration for “listening to recommendations from 
unions, economic justice advocates, and their environmental allies,” and 
building those recommendations into the policy.317 It also seems entirely 
possible that the aggressive political backlash to this controversial measure 
may have been unpreventable. 
Yet, perhaps the CPP and the procedures used to create it could have 
done more. Unlike the Malheur planning process, the unilateral “listening” 
function of administrative rulemaking here did not account for the 
alienation, autonomous decision making, or federal absenteeism that are the 
focus of this inquiry. A two-way conversation with or facilitated by Tim 
Bodeen is simply not the same as typing a comment into Regulations.gov. 
Further, although the CPP sought to address the work–environment rift, 
those efforts achieved little because most people either did not know about 
them or were not persuaded as to their effectiveness. 
The crux of what Susskind and Secunda point to, and its common 
theme with the Malheur planning process, is the need for environmental 
regulation to progress along a spectrum enshrined in the model for public 
participation developed by the International Association for Public 
Participation (IAP2)—again, returning to relatively simple principles of land 
use planning.318 This need is based both in environmental complexity and in 
the impetus to pursue consensus and buy-in, and to minimize alienation and 
conflict. The full order from least to most inclusive forms of planning on this 
spectrum proceeds, “Inform, Consult, Involve, Collaborate, Empower.”319 
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Decision makers provide the most minimal level of public involvement at the 
level of “Inform,” where they let the public know what they are doing 
without relinquishing any control.320 The opposite end of the spectrum is the 
“Empower” point, where the public wields final decision-making power.321 
Malheur’s successful process was at the “Collaborate” point, the second 
most involved type of decision making. One might argue that EPA’s decision-
making process is at the “Consult” point because it sought to inform the 
public, solicited concerns, and provided some feedback as to how public 
input influenced policy formation.322 However, the process could also be 
considered at or even below the “Inform” point, in light of the limited and 
impersonal nature of the processes used to gather public input and the 
failure of basic aspects of the plan to reach people. In sum, the CPP 
rulemaking process could be considered almost entirely top-down, 
procedures with contrary aims notwithstanding. 
A more hands-on approach—with multiple, nonperfunctory, face-to-
face interactions in different regions—while less efficient, might have 
achieved or approached a different result for the CPP. Perhaps then labor 
interests’ buy-in to the plan could have embarrassed politicians and industry 
out of their lawsuit. A question for further research is how seemingly high, 
front-end expenses in pursuit of collaboration compare to and mitigate the 
risk of the expense of litigation when regulations are so hotly contested. 
The entire EPA decision-making apparatus need not be overhauled to 
pursue these shifts. Relatively simple procedural changes such as those 
called for by Susskind and Secunda could make EPA’s decision-making 
process more closely resemble the process at Malheur, reducing conflict and 
alienation. Those procedures could take many forms: field-employee-
facilitated regional dialogues resulting in recommendations that might 
actually be implemented; municipality- or county-based processes for 
producing more in-depth feedback; or asking local coalitions to workshop 
draft rules and assess feasibility based on their respective localities’ 
circumstances. While the CPP sought to use the cooperative federalism 
model to facilitate states’ tailored decision making after the CPP went into 
effect,323 perhaps the CPP could have been a more minimalist establishment 
of procedures to start consideration of substantive matters from the bottom 
up. The principles these and other possible routes should encapsulate would 
be meaningful consideration of local decision making tailored to local 
social–ecological conditions; facilitation of stakeholder discourse with a 
view to problem-solving, to secure buy-in and produce better outcomes; 
information exchange that would educate the public about the rationales 
behind policy proposals, while also eliciting relevant considerations from 
the public; and some form of human interaction that could serve to 
personalize “the federal government.” 
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An additional reconceptualization may be useful in this context, in the 
theme of dissolving the artificial barriers that impede progress on climate 
policy. We tend to think of air pollution as an environmental issue and public 
lands disputes as a natural resource management issue. For coal miners, 
though, questions of air pollution and energy are land use and natural 
resource issues. Indeed, “the persistent application of the distinction 
[between land use and environmental law] is both artificial and antiquated, 
impeding efforts to improve ecological well-being.”324 The land use–
environmental law distinction has been criticized for “sever[ing] decision-
making processes from local ecological conditions that are experienced by 
nearby residents.”325 When we view an environmental issue such as air 
pollution through a land use/natural resources lens, though, we may be less 
inclined to balk at the prospect of a closer-to-home, more involved planning 
and management process of the type seen with public lands. Such a 
conceptual shift may be the first step toward reworking climate mitigation 
governance into a more effective, less polarizing framework—at least from 
the angle considered here. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Environmental ethicist Mark Sagoff commented in a 1986 article that 
“Americans often conceive the ends of environmental law independently 
from the means necessary to achieve them.”326 He proposed that “we should 
instead deliberate over the means and ends together, lest the perfect 
environment Americans contemplate in theory become an obstacle to the 
good environment we can achieve in fact.”327 Reconciliation of opposing 
interests could lead to an adequate environment, while conflict has already 
contributed to disastrous consequences. 
Adaptive governance in both climate adaptation and mitigation stands 
to help SESs withstand shocks, in part through helping to mend current 
social threats to system stability. The Malheur case study shows the 
framework’s potential benefits for addressing social conflicts thus far under-
discussed in climate scholarship, while the CPP demonstrates business-as-
usual obstacles. Federal brokerage of work–environment dialogues is a 
particularly important component of this scheme. This vehicle can also serve 
to address the voicelessness, exclusion of residents of rural areas (and like-
minded people) who have been alienated from government and 
environmentalism. 
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